



# F5 BIG-IP<sup>®</sup> 16.1.3.1 including SSLO Security Target

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# 1 Introduction

This section identifies the Security Target, Target of Evaluation (TOE), conformance claims, ST organization, document conventions, and terminology. It also includes an overview of the evaluated product.

## 1.1 Security Target Identification

This section will provide information necessary to identify and control the Security Target and the TOE.

ST Title:	F5 BIG-IP 16.1.3.1 including SSLO Security Target
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Developer:	F5, Inc.
ST Author:	Michelle Ruppel, Saffire Systems

## 1.2 TOE Identification

The TOE claiming conformance to this ST is identified as *BIG-IP Version 16.1.3.1 including SSLO* (build Hotfix-BIGIP-16.1.3.1.0.128.11-ENG, also referred to as 16.1.3.1+EHF) running on any of the devices identified in Section 1.2.1 . The TOE is deployed with the following license modes/modules:

- Application Delivery Controller deployment
  - Appliance Mode
  - Traffic Management Operating System (TMOS) modules
  - Traffic Management Microkernel (TMM) module
  - SSL Orchestrator (SSLO) module
  - Local Traffic Manager (LTM) module

### 1.2.1 F5 Devices

The TOE consists of any of the hardware appliances listed in Table 1 installed with LTM+SSLO with appliance mode software.

Explanation of table columns in the table below.

**SKU (stock-keeping unit).** A set of product SKUs define the hardware and software that is licensed and shipped.

Each row in this table is a delivery option consisting of multiple product SKUs. The SKUs together define the following for appliances:

- Base BIG-IP and platform (F5-BIG-LTM-nnn)
- Additional modules (F5-ADD-BIG-SSLO-nnn)
- Appliance mode (F5-ADD-BIG-MODE).

VIPRION devices are the same, but with the addition of VPR to the SKU, and the addition of a SKU specifying the chassis (for example F5-VPR-LTM-C2400-AC).

**vCMP?** A “Y” entry in the column notes that the platform supports, and the licensing allows, the use of vCMP.

**Part #.** This refers to the part number of the hardware device (appliance, blade, and/or chassis) included in the platform SKU.

**Model Series.** Designates the family of appliances or blades to which the specified SKU belongs.

SKU	VCMP?	Part #	Model Series
F5-BIG-LTM-I4600 F5-ADD-BIG-SSLO-2 F5-ADD-BIG-MODE	N	200-0390-07	i4000
F5-BIG-LTM-I5600 F5-ADD-BIG-SSLO-3 F5-ADD-BIG-MODE	N	200-0396-09	i5000
F5-BIG-LTM-I7600 F5-ADD-BIG-SSLO-3 F5-ADD-BIG-MODE	N	500-0031-01	i7000
F5-BIG-LTM-I10600 F5-ADD-BIG-SSLO-4 F5-ADD-BIG-MODE	N	500-0030-01	i10000
F5-BIG-LTM-I11600-DS F5-ADD-BIG-SSLO-4 F5-ADD-BIG-MODE	Y	500-0015-05	i11000-DS
F5-BIG-LTM-I15600 F5-ADD-BIG-SSLO-5 F5-ADD-BIG-MODE	N	500-0042-00	i15000
F5-BIG-LTM-I4800 F5-ADD-BIG-SSLO-2 F5-ADD-BIG-MODE	N	200-0390-07	i4000
F5-BIG-LTM-I5800 F5-ADD-BIG-SSLO-23 F5-ADD-BIG-MODE	Y	200-0396-09	i5000

F5-BIG-LTM-I5820-DF F5-ADD-BIG-SSLO-3 F5-ADD-BIG-MODE	Y	500-0017-17	i5000
F5-BIG-LTM-I7800 F5-ADD-BIG-SSLO-3 F5-ADD-BIG-MODE	Y	500-0031-01	i7000
F5-BIG-LTM-I7820-DF F5-ADD-BIG-SSLO-3 F5-ADD-BIG-MODE	Y	500-0032-01	i7000
F5-BIG-LTM-I10800 F5-ADD-BIG-SSLO-4 F5-ADD-BIG-MODE	Y	500-0030-01	i10000
F5-BIG-LTM-I11800-DS F5-ADD-BIG-SSLO-4 F5-ADD-BIG-MODE	Y	500-0015-05	i11000-DS
F5-BIG-LTM-I15800 F5-ADD-BIG-SSLO-5 F5-ADD-BIG-MODE	Y	500-0042-00	i15000
F5-BIG-LTM-I15820-DF F5-ADD-BIG-SSLO-5 F5-ADD-BIG-MODE	Y	500-0043-00	i15000-DF
F5-VPR-LTM-C2400-AC F5-VPR-LTM-B2250 F5-ADD-VPR-SSLOC2X00 F5-ADD-BIG-MODE F5-ADD-VPR-VCMP-2400	Y	400-0028-12 400-0039-03	C2400 B2250



F5-VPR-LTM-C4480-AC	Y	400-0033-04	C4480
F5-VPR-LTM-B4450		400-0053-11	B4450
F5-ADD-VPR-SSLOC44X0			
F5-ADD-BIG-MODE			
F5-ADD-VPR-VCMP-4480			

**Table 1: Supported Hardware Models**

Each of the hardware platforms includes a third party proprietary cryptographic acceleration card. All hardware platforms, except the B2250, include the Intel Coletto Creek (8955). The B2250 model includes the Cavium Nitrox (CN3540-500-C20).

## 1.3 Document Terminology

Please refer to CC Part 1 Section 4 for definitions of commonly used CC terms.

### 1.3.1 ST Specific Terminology

This section contains definitions of technical terms that are used with a meaning specific to this document. Terms defined in the CC Part 2 are not reiterated here, unless stated otherwise.

#### Administrators

Administrators are administrative users of the TOE, i.e. those users defined in the TOE to be authorized to access the configuration interfaces of the TOE. Different roles can be assigned to administrators, including the Administrator role -- the name of the role is not to be confused with the general reference to an administrator being an administrative user of the TOE in any role.

#### User

Humans or machines interacting with the TOE via the provided user and programmatic interfaces. The TOE deals with different types of users -- administrators in charge of configuring and operating the TOE, and traffic users who are subject to the TOE's networking capabilities. User interactions with the TOE are transparent to the user, and in most cases the users are not aware of the existence of the TOE.

### 1.3.2 Acronyms

CC	Common Criteria
CMI	Central Management Infrastructure
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CRLDP	Certificate Revocation List Distribution Point
GUI	Graphical User Interface
HSL	High-Speed Logging
LTM	Local Traffic Manager
OSP	Organisational Security Policy
PP	Protection Profile
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SOAP	Simple Object Access Protocol

TLS	Transport Layer Security
TMM	Traffic Management Microkernel
TMOS	Traffic Management Operating System
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSC	TSF Scope of Control
TSF	TOE Security Functions
TSP	TOE Security Policy
vCMP	Virtual Clustered Multi-Processing
VE	Virtual Edition

## 1.4 TOE Type

The TOE type is a Networking Device.

## 1.5 TOE Overview

The BIG-IP products subject to this evaluation represent Application Delivery Controllers based on F5's Traffic Management Operating System (TMOS). In particular,

- SSL Orchestrator (SSLO), which includes the Local Traffic Manager (LTM) and SSLO modules, provides network traffic management capabilities.

BIG-IP products run on appliance or blade hardware provided by F5 listed in Section 1.2.1 . In addition, BIG-IP running as a guest instance on F5 devices (appliances or blades) that support F5's Virtual Clustered Multiprocessing (vCMP) environment is included. vCMP implements a purpose-built embedded hypervisor that allows organizations to run multiple virtual instances of BIG-IP on the same hardware.)

The TOE is located between a monitored client and a requested server enabling the TOE to intercept TLS traffic between the two endpoints. The TOE's Traffic Management Microkernel (TMM), along with additional software, provides basic networking functionality, with the TOE operating as a network switch and reverse proxy. The BIG-IP SSLO implements secured connections between the monitored client and the requested server with BIG-IP SSLO in the middle. This is accomplished by establishing two TLS sessions: one TLS session between the monitored client and BIG-IP SSLO and the other between BIG-IP SSLO and the requested server endpoint. This includes the following security functions:

- **Security Audit:** BIG-IP implements syslog capabilities to generate audit records for security-relevant events. In addition, the BIG-IP protects the audit trail from unauthorized modifications and loss of audit data due to insufficient space.
- **Cryptographic Support:** In BIG-IP, cryptographic functionality in the control plane is provided by the OpenSSL cryptographic module. The BIG-IP provides a secure shell (SSH) to allow administrators to connect over a dedicated network interface. BIG-IP also implements the TLS protocol to allow administrators to remotely manage the TOE. BIG-IP implements a TLS client for interactions with other TLS servers. The BIG-IP SSLO cryptography is provided by the cryptographic module within TMM, also based on OpenSSL. SSLO implements the TLS protocol with forward proxy capabilities including inspection processing, bypassing inspection processing, and blocking unauthorized sessions.

Both of these cryptographic implementations utilize a cryptographic module which provides random number generation, key generation, key establishment, key storage, key destruction, hash operations, encryption/decryption operations, and digital signature operations. A limited Certification Authority (CA) is also embedded in the BIG-IP SSLO to issue

certificates in order to establish TLS sessions with the monitored client and the requested server endpoint.

- **Identification and Authentication:** An internal password-based repository is implemented for authentication of management users. BIG-IP enforces a strong password policy and disabling user accounts after a configured number of failed authentication attempts.
- **Security Function Management:** A command line interface (available via the traffic management shell "tmsh"), web-based GUI ("Configuration utility"), a SOAP-based API ("iControl API"), and a REST-based API ("iControl REST API") are offered to administrators for all relevant configuration of security functionality. The TOE manages configuration objects in a partition which includes users, server pools, etc. This includes the authentication of administrators by user name and password, as well as access control based on pre-defined roles and, optionally, groups of objects ("Profiles"). "Profiles" can be defined for individual servers and classes of servers that the TOE forwards traffic from clients to, and for traffic that matches certain characteristics, determining the kind of treatment applicable to that traffic. Management capabilities offered by the TOE include the definition of templates for certain configuration options. The management functionality also implements roles for separation of duties.
- **Protection of the TSF:** BIG-IP implements many capabilities to protect the integrity and management of its own security functionality. These capabilities include the protection of sensitive data, such as passwords and keys, self-tests, product update verification, and reliable time stamping.
- **TOE Access:** Prior to interactive user authentication, the BIG-IP can display an administrative-defined banner. BIG-IP terminates interactive sessions after an administrator-defined period of inactivity and allows users to terminate their own authenticated session.
- **Trusted Path / Channels:** The TOE protects remote connections to its management interfaces with TLS and SSH. The TOE also protects communication channels with audit servers using TLS.
- **User Data Protection:** The BIG-IP SSLO implements certificate profiles for TLS server certificates issued by the CA embedded in the TOE, enforces TLS plaintext processing policies, ensures residual information contained in TLS buffers is not available, protects trusted public keys and certificates used in SSLO, and performs inspection operations and proxy functions of SSLO sessions.

## 1.6 TOE Description

### 1.6.1 Introduction

Typical BIG-IP network environments include an internal network, administrator network, external network, server pools, and redundant BIG-IP systems. In this typical example,

- Internet connections are mediated by BIG-IP to provide access to certain resources located in an organization's internal server pool, for example to a web-based e-commerce system presenting a storefront to consumers
- Users in the organization's Intranet also access resources in the server pools to interact with the internal server pool. Although not included in the TOE, BIG-IP provides server termination of traffic flowing to a backend server by implementing a TLS client protocol.
- Network administrators connect to BIG-IP via a dedicated network interface to administer the TOE
- TLS connections from the organization's Intranet to servers hosted on the Internet are mediated by BIG-IP to provide the capability to decrypt encrypted traffic, inspect the traffic using security controls, then re-encrypt the traffic and transmit it to its destination

- The TOE is optionally set up in a redundant failover configuration, with heartbeat monitoring and reporting via a data link between the two instances

When deployed as two redundant systems configured in an active/standby failover configuration, the two systems can synchronize their configuration data and provide state and persistence monitoring. The TOE will fail over to the redundant system while maintaining a secure configuration if failures the active device sends a request to the standby device or if the standby device detects missing heartbeats from the active device. The new active device will continue to enforce security policies for new (and possibly active) connections mediated by the TOE. BIG-IP uses CMI (Central Management Infrastructure), a proprietary protocol, for the incremental exchange of configuration data and failover status between TOE instances; CMI is encapsulated in TLS to provide integrity and confidentiality protections. In this configuration a physical network port will be dedicated on each device for the exchange of synchronization data and failover monitoring with the standby device. Failover / redundancy is not in the scope of the evaluated configuration. Connection mirroring does not function with SSL forward proxy connections.

## 1.6.2 Architecture Description


The TOE is separated into two (2) distinct planes, the control plane and the data plane. The control plane validates, stores, and passes configuration data to all necessary systems. It also provides all administrative access to the TOE. The data plane passes user traffic through the TOE.

The TOE implements and supports the following network protocols: TLS (client and server), SSH, HTTPS, FTP. The TOE protects remote connections to its management interfaces with TLS and SSH. The TOE also protects communication channels with audit servers using TLS (TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2). The cryptographic functionality implemented in the TOE is provided by OpenSSL.

The TOE is divided into the following subsystems:

- F5 Device (hardware or virtual) for F5 devices or vCMP deployments,
- Traffic Management Operating System (TMOS),
- Traffic Management Micro-kernel (TMM),
- SSL Orchestrator (SSLO), and
- Local Traffic Manager (LTM).

F5's TMOS is a Linux-based operating system customized for performance and to execute on the TOE hardware or in the TOE Virtual Clustered Multiprocessing (vCMP) environment. The vCMP is an embedded hypervisor that allows multiple instances of the TOE to execute on the same underlying hardware. The TMM is the data plane of the product and all data plane traffic passes through the TMM. The LTM controls network traffic coming into or exiting the local area network (LAN) and provides the ability to intercept and redirect incoming network traffic. The SSLO module intercepts a TLS session between a monitored client and requested server and implements a TLS session between the monitored client and the TOE and another TLS session between the TOE and the requested server. The SSLO module can also be configured to send the intercepted traffic to external inspection services.



**Figure 1: BIG-IP Subsystems for F5 Devices and vCMP in Application Delivery Controller Deployments**

TMOS is a Linux operating system that runs directly on device hardware, in a vCMP environment. TMOS is a modified version of the RedHat Linux kernel. In addition to providing the standard operating system features (such as process management, file management, etc), the TMOS provides the following security features for the TOE:

- Auditing functionality, using the host system's syslog capabilities. (In addition, a concept called "high-speed logging" (HSL) allows TMM instances to send certain log traffic directly to external audit servers.)
- Time stamping
- Management functionality, presented to consumers via a dedicated shell providing a command line interface (traffic management shell, "tmsh") that can be reached by administrators via SSH (OpenSSH); and via a web GUI ("Configuration Utility"), a SOAP protocol interface ("iControl API"), or REST interface ("iControl REST API") that can be reached through a network interface via HTTPS. Those management interfaces are implemented in the background by a central management control program daemon (mcpd) that provides configuration information to individual TOE parts and coordinates its persistent storage.
- Authentication functionality is enforced on all administrative interfaces. Administrative interfaces implement an internal password-based repository for authentication of administrative users.


- Cryptographic algorithms provided by OpenSSL.
- Individual daemons introduced by BIG-IP packages, such as the modules implementing the LTM and SSLO logic.

At the core of BIG-IP is a concept referred to as Traffic Management Microkernel (TMM), representing the data plane of the product when compared to traditional network device architectures. It is implemented by a daemon running with root privileges, performing its own memory management, and having direct access to the network hardware. TMM implements a number of sequential filters both for the “client-side” and “server-side” network interfaces served by BIG-IP. The filters implemented in TMM include a TCP, TLS, compression, and HTTP filter, amongst others. If the hardware provides more than one CPU, TMM runs multi-threaded (one thread per CPU). In this case, disaggregators in the kernel are responsible for de-multiplexing and multiplexing network traffic for handling by an individual TMM thread. In addition to the actual switch hardware, F5 appliance hardware also contains a High-Speed Bridge (HSB, implemented by means of an FPGA) that performs basic traffic filtering functionality as instructed by TMM.

Additional plug-in filters can be added to this queue by individual product packages. These plug-ins typically have a filter component in TMM, with additional and more complex logic in a counter-part implemented in a Linux-based daemon (module). The plug-in modules relevant to the SSLO Deployments are shown in Figure 2. These plug-in modules include:

- Local Traffic Manager (LTM): authentication of HTTP (based on Apache) traffic and advanced traffic forwarding directives
- SSL Orchestrator (SSLO): enhance TLS-based client connectivity by providing visibility into TLS traffic and the ability for external inspection services on that traffic.

A diagram depicting aspects of the TOE’s architecture and the boundaries of the TOE are provided in Figure 2.



**Figure 2: Architectural aspects of BIG-IP – F5 Device and vCMP in Application Delivery Controller Deployments**

### 1.6.3 Physical Boundaries

This section lists the physical components of the product and denotes which are in the TOE and which are in the environment.

#### 1.6.3.1 Physical boundaries

When BIG-IP version 16.1.3.1 is running on one of the F5 devices identified in Section 1.2.1, the TOE includes hardware and software physical components as identified in Section 1.2.1.

The evaluated configuration of *BIG-IP Version 16.1.3.1 including SSLO* represents a licensing option with the following F5 modules present and operational:

- Application Delivery Controller deployment
  - Appliance Mode
  - Traffic Management Operating System (TMOS) modules
  - Traffic Management Microkernel (TMM) module
  - SSL Orchestrator (SSLO) module
  - Local Traffic Manager (LTM) module

The following required components can be found in the operating environment of the TOE on systems other than those hosting the TOE:

- audit servers.

Client software (e.g., the BIG-IP Client for TLS VPN connections, endpoint inspection software executed on clients) are optional components that are not part of the TOE.

### 1.6.3.2 Guidance Documentation

Relevant guidance documents for the secure operation of BIG-IP that are part of the TOE are:

<b>Certification-specific References</b>
<b><i>K76615426: Common Criteria Certification for BIG-IP 16.1.3.1</i></b>
<b><i>BIG-IP Common Criteria Evaluation Configuration Guide BIG-IP Release 16.1.3.1 Including SSLO</i></b>
<b>General BIG-IP References</b>
<b><i>BIG-IP Device Service Clustering: Administration</i></b>
<b><i>BIG-IP Digital Certificates: Administration</i></b>
<b><i>BIG-IP Local Traffic Manager: Implementations</i></b>
<b><i>BIG-IP Local Traffic Manager: Monitors Reference</i></b>
<b><i>BIG-IP Local Traffic Manager: Profiles Reference</i></b>
<b><i>BIG-IP Local Traffic Manager: Configuring a Custom Cipher String for SSL Negotiation</i></b>
<b><i>BIG-IP Release Note</i></b>
<b><i>BIG-IP System: Essentials</i></b>
<b><i>BIG-IP System: SSL Administration</i></b>
<b><i>BIG-IP System: User Account Administration</i></b>
<b><i>BIG-IP Systems: Getting Started Guide</i></b>
<b><i>BIG-IP TMOS: Implementations</i></b>
<b><i>BIG-IP TMOS: Routing Administration</i></b>
<b><i>External Monitoring of BIG-IP Systems: Implementations</i></b>
<b><i>GUI Help Files</i></b>
<b><i>iControl API Reference</i></b>
<b><i>iControl REST API User Guide</i></b>
<b><i>K08859735: Overview of the FTP profile (14.x – 16.x)</i></b>
<b><i>K12042624: Restricting access to the Configuration utility using client certificates (13.x – 16.x)</i></b>
<b><i>K13092: Overview of securing access to the BIG-IP system</i></b>
<b><i>K13123: Managing BIG-IP product hotfixes (11.x – 17.x)</i></b>
<b><i>K13302: Configuring the BIG-IP system to use an SSL chain certificate (11.x – 16.x)</i></b>
<b><i>K13454: Configuring SSH public key authentication on BIG-IP systems (11.x – 16.x)</i></b>
<b><i>K14620: Managing SSL Certificates for BIG-IP systems using the Configuration utility</i></b>
<b><i>K14783: Overview of the Client SSL profile (11.x – 17.x)</i></b>
<b><i>K14806: Overview of the Server SSL profile (11.x – 17.x)</i></b>
<b><i>K15462: Managing SSL certificates for BIG-IP systems using tmsh</i></b>
<b><i>K15497: Configuring a secure password policy for the BIG-IP system (11.x – 16.x)</i></b>
<b><i>K15664: Overview of BIG-IP device certificates (11.x – 16.x)</i></b>
<b><i>K42531434: Replacing the Configuration utility's self-signed SSL certificate with a CA-signed SSL certificate</i></b>
<b><i>K48615077: BIG-IP Daemons (15.x – 16.x)</i></b>
<b><i>K5532: Configuring the level of information logged for Traffic Management-related events</i></b>
<b><i>K6068: Configuring a pre-login or post-login message banner for the BIG-IP or Enterprise Manager system</i></b>
<b><i>K7683: Connecting a serial terminal to a BIG-IP system</i></b>



<b><i>K7752: Licensing the BIG-IP system</i></b>
<b><i>K8021: Configuring the BIG-IP LTM system to allow outbound FTP sessions</i></b>
<b><i>K80425458: Modifying the list of ciphers and MAC algorithms used by the SSH service on the BIG-IP system or BIG-IQ system</i></b>
<b><i>K9908: Configuring an automatic logout for idle sessions</i></b>
<b><i>K75106155: Configuring OCSP stapling (13.x – 16.x)</i></b>
<b><a href="#">F5 SSL Orchestrator Deployment Guide - Version 9</a></b>
<b><i>README.Hotfix-BIGIP-16.1.3.1.0.119.11-ENG.txt</i></b>
<b><i>Traffic Management Shell (tmsh) Reference Guide (versions 17.0.0 and 12.0.0<sup>1</sup>)</i></b>
<b>Platform-specific References – Hardware and vCMP</b>
<b><i>Platform Guide: i2000/i4000 Series</i></b>
<b><i>Platform Guide: i5000/i7000/i10000/i11000 Series</i></b>
<b><i>Platform Guide: i15000 Series</i></b>
<b><i>Platform Guide: VIPRION® 2200</i></b>
<b><i>Platform Guide: VIPRION® 4400 Series</i></b>
<b><i>vCMP for Appliance Models: Administration</i></b>
<b><i>vCMP for VIPRION Systems: Administration</i></b>

**Table 2: Guidance Documentation**

#### 1.6.4 Logical Boundaries

The following security functions provided by the TOE are described in more detail in the subsections below:

- Security Audit
- Cryptographic Support
- Identification and Authentication
- Security Management
- Protection of the TSF
- TOE Access
- Trusted Path/Channels
- User Data Protection

The following configuration specifics apply to the evaluated configuration of the TOE:

- Appliance mode is licensed. Appliance mode disables root access to the TOE operating system and disables bash shell.
- Certificate validation is performed using CRLs.
- Disabled interfaces:
  - All command shells other than tmsh are disabled. For example, bash and other user-serviceable shells are excluded.

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<sup>1</sup> The tmsh reference guide version 17.0.0 zipfile contains the pages for each of the tmsh commands. The 12.0.0 pdf contains additional general information that is still valid in 16.1.3.1 but not reproduced in the 17.0.0 zipfile.

- Management of the TOE via SNMP is disabled.
- Management of the TOE via the appliance's LCD display is disabled. (applicable to F5 devices and vCMP only)
- Remote (i.e., SSH) access to the Lights Out / Always On Management<sup>2</sup> capabilities of the system is disabled. (applicable to F5 devices and vCMP only)
- SSH client

#### **1.6.4.1 Security Audit**

BIG-IP implements auditing functionality based on standard syslog functionality. This includes the support of remote audit servers for capturing of audit records. Audit records are generated for all security-relevant events, such as the use of configuration interfaces by administrators, the authentication of traffic, and the application of network traffic rules.

While the TOE can store audit records locally for cases when an external log server becomes unavailable, in the evaluated configuration an external log server is used as the primary means of archiving audit records.

In the evaluated configuration, BIG-IP logs a warning to notify the administrator when the local audit storage exceeds a configurable maximum size. Once the configurable maximum size is reached, BIG-IP overwrites the oldest audit records.

#### **1.6.4.2 Cryptographic Support**

All cryptographic operations, including algorithms and key generation used by the TOE are provided by the F5 cryptographic module (OpenSSL) within the TMOS.

Various security functions in BIG-IP rely on cryptographic mechanisms for their effective implementation. Trusted paths for the TOE administrator are provided by SSH for the tmsh administrative interface and by TLS for the Configuration utility, iControl API and iControl REST API. For administrative sessions, the TOE always acts as a server. For traffic sessions, the TOE may act as a TLS client or server. Trusted channels between the TOE and external entities, such as a syslog server, are provided by TLS connections.

For TLS sessions, the TOE implements certificate validation using the OpenSSL crypto library.

The TOE utilizes cryptographic algorithms that have been validated using the NIST ACVP tests.

For F5 devices and vCMP platforms, the underlying hardware platforms of the TOE include a third party proprietary cryptographic acceleration card that is used to provide both sufficient entropy to support random number generation (RNG) and acceleration.

##### **1.6.4.2.1 Key Generation**

The TOE can generate asymmetric keys using RSA schemes and ECC schemes. For F5 devices and vCMP platforms, the underlying hardware platforms of the TOE include a third party proprietary cryptographic acceleration card that is used to provide sufficient entropy to support RNG. For F5 devices and vCMP platforms, the TOE provides a total of four entropy sources. The TOE can generate keys (and certificates) for a number of uses, including:

- Keypairs for the SSH server functionality
- TLS server and client certificates

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<sup>2</sup> Lights Out / Always On Management is an add-on module providing a management system for non-security related features not required for operation of the TOE.


- Session keys for SSH and TLS sessions

#### 1.6.4.2.2 SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy

The TOE implements an administrator-configurable SSL/TLS Inspection proxy. The administrator configures SSL forward proxy profiles to define which TLS connections are subject to inspection, to define the TLS session parameters of the connections, and to define any inspection services that will be performed on the connection.

The SSLO module accomplishes the inspection operation by terminating TLS sessions between a monitored client and the requested server that meet the SSLO policy conditions, then replacing the end-to-end connection with two TLS sessions that terminate at the TOE. The TOE establishes a TLS session between the TOE (acting as the monitored client) and the requested server and a second TLS session between the TOE (acting as the requested server) and the monitored client. By intercepting the TLS session, the TOE can send the decrypted traffic to an external inspection service for processing.

As configured by the SSL forward proxy profiles, SSLO also determines which TLS sessions should bypass inspection processing and be routed without decryption, inspection, and modification. When SSLO determines that a session is not authorized, the session is blocked and the traffic is not routed to the other endpoint.



**Figure 3: BIG-IP SSLO Traffic**

#### 1.6.4.3 Identification and Authentication

The TOE identifies individual administrative users by user name and authenticates them by passwords stored in a local configuration database; the TOE can enforce a password policy based on overall minimum length and number of characters of different types required. BIG-IP obscures passwords entered by users.

Authentication of administrators is enforced at all configuration interfaces, i.e. at the shell (tmsh, via SSH), the Configuration utility (web-based GUI), iControl API, and iControl REST API.

#### 1.6.4.4 Security Management

The TOE allows administrators to configure all relevant aspects of security functionality implemented by the TSF. For this purpose, BIG-IP offers multiple interfaces to administrators:

- Configuration utility  
The Configuration utility presents a web-based GUI available to administrators via HTTPS that allows administration of most aspects of the TSF.
- traffic management shell (tmsh)  
tmsh is a shell providing a command line interface that is available via SSH. It allows administration of all aspects of the TSF.

- **iControl API**  
The iControl API is a SOAP based protocol interface that allows programmatic access to the TSF configuration via HTTPS.
- **iControl REST API**  
The iControl REST API is effectively a front-end to tmsh and is built on the Representational State Transfer (REST), which allows programmatic access to the TSF via HTTPS.

The TOE provides the ability to administer the TOE both locally and remotely using any of the four administrative interfaces. Local administration is performed via the serial port console. By default and in the evaluated configuration, remote access to the management interfaces is only made available on the dedicated management network port of a BIG-IP system.

BIG-IP implements a hierarchy of roles that are pre-defined to grant administrators varying degrees of control over the basic configuration of the TOE, and additional roles are introduced for module-specific tasks. These roles can be assigned to users by authorized administrators.

In addition to roles, the TOE allows the definition of partitions. Configuration objects, such as server pools or service profiles, can be assigned to individual partitions, as can administrative users. This allows administrative access of individual administrators to be restricted to configuration objects that belong to the partition that has been assigned to the user.

#### ***1.6.4.5 Protection of the TSF***

The TOE is designed to protect critical security data, including keys and passwords. In addition, the TOE includes self-tests that monitor continue operation of the TOE to ensure that it is operating correctly. The TOE also provides a mechanism to provide trusted updates to the TOE firmware or software and reliable timestamps in order to support TOE functions, including accurate audit recording.

#### ***1.6.4.6 TOE access***

The TOE implements session inactivity time-outs for Configuration utility and tmsh sessions and displays a warning banner before establishing an interactive session between a human user and the TOE.

#### ***1.6.4.7 Trusted Path/Channels***

This chapter summarizes the security functionality provided by the TOE in order to protect the confidentiality and integrity of network connections described below.

##### **1.6.4.7.1 Generic network traffic**

The BIG-IP allows the termination of data plane TLS connections on behalf of internal servers or server pools. External clients can thus connect via TLS to the TOE, which acts as a TLS server and decrypts the traffic and then forwards it to internal servers for processing of the content. It is also possible to (re-) encrypt traffic from the TOE to servers in the organization with TLS, with the TOE acting as a TLS client.

##### **1.6.4.7.2 Administrative traffic**

The TOE secures administrative traffic (i.e., administrators connecting to the TOE in order to configure and maintain it) as follows:

- Remote access to the traffic management shell (tmsh) is secured via SSH.
- Remote access to the web-based Configuration utility, iControl REST API, and iControl API is secured via TLS.

##### **1.6.4.7.3 OpenSSH**

The TOE SSH implementation is based on OpenSSH; however, the TOE OpenSSH configuration sets the implementation via the `sshd_config` as follows:

- Supports two types of authentication, RSA public-key and password-based
- Packets greater than (256\*1024) bytes are dropped
- The transport encryption algorithms are limited to AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256, AES-CTR-128, AES-CTR-256
- The SSH public-key authentication algorithms are limited to `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`, `ecdsa-sha2-nistp384`
- The transport data integrity algorithm is limited to HMAC-SHA1 and HMAC-SHA2-256
- The SSH protocol key exchange mechanism is limited to `ecdh-sha2-nistp256` and `ecdh-sha2-nistp384`.

#### 1.6.4.7.4 Remote logging

The TOE offers the establishment of TLS sessions with external log hosts in the operational environment for protection of audit records in transfer.

#### **1.6.4.8 User Data Protection**

The TOE implements certificate profiles for TLS server certificates issued by the CA embedded in the TOE and issues certificates as specified by these profiles. The TOE is also capable of providing a method to link the TLS server certificates validated by the TOE to the forged certificate issued by the TOE to represent that server. The TOE performs TLS plaintext processing policies when the policy authorizes inspection processing.

Residual information contained in TLS buffers is not available upon allocation of the resource. Trusted public keys and certificates used in SSLO are protected.

### **1.6.5 Delivery**

#### **1.6.5.1 F5 Devices and vCMP**

The F5 BIG-IP hardware is manufactured and shipped via common carrier from an authorized subcontractor, Flextronics, headquartered in Milpitas, California. Manufacturing for the BIG-IP product consists of assembling the hardware, loading the BIG-IP software image onto the hard disk drive and performing test and inspection activities. Flextronics has been qualified by F5, Inc. to manufacture, test, and deliver the BIG-IP product through an on-site assessment, process evaluation and F5, Inc. Supplier Approval Program.

The BIG-IP system arrives from the factory with the SKU-specified software pre-installed. However, to guard against potential tampering during shipping, customers are directed to reinstall the software from the F5 download website. Instructions for this are in the Guidance document.

#### **1.6.5.2 Documentation**

Administrator, Configuration, and Installation manuals are made available to customers on the F5 Website by product model number and applicable revision. Manuals are not shipped with the product.

In addition, an ISO of the customer documentation referenced by this evaluation is available in the same download directory as the product ISO. The documentation ISO, like the product ISO, is available only over a TLS or HTTPS connection. For additional security, the sha256 checksum of the ISO is also published with the ISO; its file name is the ISO file name concatenated with ".sha256".

## 2 Conformance Claims

### 2.1 CC Conformance Claims

This ST was developed to Common Criteria (CC) for Information Technology Security Evaluation – April 2017 Version 3.1, Revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-001

The ST claims to be:

- CC Version 3.1 Part 2 extended
- CC Version 3.1 Part 3 conformant

### 2.2 PP and Package Claims

The ST claims exact conformance to the following:

- PP-Configuration for Network Device and SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy (STIP) (CFG\_ND-STIP\_V1.1), Version 1.1, 2023-10-06

CFG\_ND-STIP\_V1.1 consists of the following components:

- collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDcPP), Version 2.2e, 23-March 2020 conformant
- PP-Module for SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy (STIPM), Version 1.1, 2022-11-17

The ST is compliant with the following NDcPP technical decisions:

NDcPP Technical Decision	Applicability
<a href="#">0800 – Updated NIT Technical Decision for IPsec IKE/SA Lifetimes Tolerance</a>	Not applicable. The TOE does not claim FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1
<a href="#">0792 – NIT Technical Decision: FIA_PMG_EXT.1 - TSS EA not in line with SFR</a>	Applicable.
<a href="#">0790 – NIT Technical Decision: Clarification Required for testing IPv6</a>	Applicable.
<a href="#">0738 – NIT Technical Decision for Link to Allowed-With List</a>	Applicable.
<a href="#">0670 – NIT Technical Decision for Mutual and Non-Mutual Auth TLSC Testing</a>	Applicable.
<a href="#">0639 – NIT Technical Decision for Clarification for NTP MAC Keys</a>	Not applicable. The TOE does not claim FCS_NTP_EXT.1
<a href="#">0638 – NIT Technical Decision for Key Pair Generation for Authentication</a>	Applicable.
<a href="#">0636 – NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of Public Key User Authentication for SSH</a>	Not applicable. The TOE does not claim FCS_SSHC_EXT.1.
<a href="#">0635 – NIT Technical Decision for TLS Server and Key Agreement Parameters</a>	Applicable.

NDcPP Technical Decision	Applicability
<a href="#">0633 – NIT Technical Decision for IPsec IKE/SA Lifetimes Tolerance</a>	Not applicable. The TOE does not claim FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.
<a href="#">0632 – NIT Technical Decision for Consistency with Time Data for vNDs</a>	Applicable, but the TOE does not obtain time from the underlying virtualization system.
<a href="#">0631 – NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of public key authentication for SSH Server</a>	Applicable.
<a href="#">0592 – NIT Technical Decision for Local Storage of Audit Records</a>	Applicable.
<a href="#">0591 – NIT Technical Decision for Virtual TOEs and hypervisors</a>	Applicable, but the TOE does not include VMs.
<a href="#">0581 – NIT Technical Decision for Elliptic curve-based key establishment and NIST SP 800-56Arev3</a>	Not applicable. The TOE implements elliptic curve-based key establishment that confirms to NIST SP 800-56Arev2, not NIST SP 800-56Arev3.
<a href="#">0580 – NIT Technical Decision for clarification about use of DH14 in NDcPPv2.2e</a>	Not applicable. The TOE does not implement FFC schemes for cryptographic key establishment.
<a href="#">0572 – NIT Technical Decision for Restricting FTP_ITC.1 to only IP address identifiers</a>	Applicable.
<a href="#">0571 – NIT Technical Decision for Guidance on how to handle FIA_AFL.1</a>	Applicable.
<a href="#">0570 – NIT Technical Decision for Clarification about FIA_AFL.1</a>	Applicable.
<a href="#">0569 – NIT Technical Decision for Session ID Usage Conflict in FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.7</a>	Applicable.
<a href="#">0564 – NIT Technical Decision for Vulnerability Analysis Search Criteria</a>	Applicable.
<a href="#">0563 – NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of audit date information</a>	Applicable.
<a href="#">0556 – NIT Technical Decision for RFC 5077 question</a>	Applicable.
<a href="#">0555 – NIT Technical Decision for RFC Reference incorrect in TLSS Test</a>	Applicable.
<a href="#">0547 – NIT Technical Decision for Clarification on developer disclosure of AVA_VAN</a>	Applicable.

<b>NDcPP Technical Decision</b>	<b>Applicability</b>
<a href="#">0546 – NIT Technical Decision for DTLS - clarification of Application Note 63</a>	Not applicable. The TOE does not claim FCS_DTLS_EXT.1
<a href="#">0537 - NIT Technical Decision for Incorrect reference to FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.3</a>	Applicable.
<a href="#">0536 - NIT Technical Decision for Update Verification Inconsistency</a>	Applicable.
<a href="#">0528 - NIT Technical Decision for Missing EAs for FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4</a>	Not applicable. The TOE does not claim FCS_NTP_EXT.1
<a href="#">0527 - Updates to Certificate Revocation Testing (FIA_X509_EXT.1)</a>	Applicable. The ST supports EC certificates

The ST is compliant with the following STIPM TDs:

<b>STIPM Technical Decision</b>	<b>Applicability</b>
<a href="#">0808 – Clarification on ECU Fields for FIA_X509_EXT.1/STIP</a>	Applicable.
<a href="#">0774 – Correction to Supported Cipher Suite in FCS_TTTC_EXT.1.1 and FCS_TTTS_EXT.1.1</a>	Applicable.
<a href="#">0741 – Arbitrary Ciphers in FCS_TTTC/S_EXT</a>	Applicable.

The ST was also evaluated against the individual evaluation activities

- Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP, Version 2.2, 20-December-2019
- Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document PP-Module for SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy, Version 1.1, 2022-11-17

## 2.3 Conformance Rationale

The ST claims exact conformance to the CFG\_ND-STIP\_V1.1.



### 3 Security Problem Definition

A network device has a network infrastructure role it is designed to provide. In doing so, the network device communicates with other network devices and other network entities (an entity not defined as a network device) over the network. At the same time, it must provide a minimal set of common security functionality expected by all network devices. The security problem to be addressed by a compliant network device is defined as this set of common security functionality that addresses the threats that are common to network devices, as opposed to those that might be targeting the specific functionality of a specific type of network device. The set of common security functionality addresses communication with the network device, both authorized and unauthorized, the ability to perform valid or secure updates, the ability to audit device activity, the ability to securely store and utilize device and administrator credentials and data, and the ability to self-test critical device components for failures.

A STIP is a network device that embeds limited CA functionality to support the replacement of end-to-end TLS sessions with TLS session threads, making the underlying plaintext available to additional network security functionality. As such, it exposes data within the TOE boundary, and to external processes, which would normally be encrypted. It manages a CA signing key that is trusted by the monitored clients to issue TLS server certificates representing the requested servers for which inspection is authorized.

The TOE is intended to be used either in environments in which, at most, sensitive but unclassified information is processed, or the sensitivity level of information in both the internal and external networks is equivalent.

This security target includes a restatement of the Security Problem Definition (threats, organizational security policies, and assumptions) from NDcPP and STIPM. The threats, organizational security policies and assumptions are repeated here for the convenience of the reader. Refer to the NDcPP and STIPM for additional detail.

#### 3.1 Threat Environment

This section describes the threat model for the TOE and identifies the individual threats that are assumed to exist in the operational environment of the TOE.

The **assets** to be protected by the TOE are:

- Critical network traffic (administration traffic, authentication traffic, audit traffic, etc.) to/from the TOE
- The TSF and TSF data

The **threat agents** having an interest in manipulating the TOE and TSF behavior to gain access to these assets can be categorized as:

- Unauthorized third parties (“attackers”, such as malicious remote users, parties, or external IT entities) which are unknown to the TOE and its runtime environment. Attackers are traditionally located outside the organizational environment that the TOE is employed to protect, but may include organizational insiders, too.
- Authorized users of the TOE (i.e., administrators) who try to manipulate configuration data that they are not authorized to access. TOE administrators, as well as administrators of the operational environment, are assumed to be trustworthy, trained and to follow the instructions provided to them with respect to the secure configuration and operation of the systems under their responsibility. Hence, only inadvertent attempts to manipulate the safe operation of the TOE are expected from this community.

The motivation of threat agents is assumed to be commensurate with the assurance level pursued by this evaluation, i.e., the TOE intends to resist penetration by attackers with a Basic attack potential.

## **3.2 Threats**

The threats identified in this section may be addressed by the TOE, TOE environment, or a combination of both. The threat agents are authorized persons/processes, unauthorized persons/processes, or external IT entities not authorized to use the TOE itself. The threats identified assume that the threat agent is a person with a low attack potential who possesses an average expertise, few resources, and low to moderate motivation.

### **T.UNAUTHORIZED\_ADMINISTRATOR\_ACCESS**

Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the Network Device by nefarious means such as masquerading as an Administrator to the device, masquerading as the device to an Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its entirety, or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide access to the administrative session, or sessions between Network Devices. Successfully gaining Administrator access allows malicious actions that compromise the security functionality of the device and the network on which it resides.

### **T.WEAK\_CRYPTOGRAPHY**

Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key space and give them unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or control the traffic with minimal effort.

### **T.UNTRUSTED\_COMMUNICATION\_CHANNELS**

Threat agents may attempt to target Network Devices that do not use standardized secure tunneling protocols to protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take advantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key management to successfully perform man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of confidentiality and integrity of the critical network traffic, and potentially could lead to a compromise of the Network Device itself.

### **T.WEAK\_AUTHENTICATION\_ENDPOINTS**

Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak methods to authenticate the endpoints – e.g., shared password that is guessable or transported as plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the Administrator or another device, and the attacker could insert themselves into the network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle attack. The result is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the Network Device itself could be compromised.

### **T.UPDATE\_COMPROMISE**

Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the software or firmware which undermines the security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the update firmware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.

### **T.UNDETECTED\_ACTIVITY**

Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security functionality of the Network Device without Administrator awareness. This could result in the attacker finding an

avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise the device and the Administrator would have no knowledge that the device has been compromised.

### **T.SECURITY\_FUNCTIONALITY\_COMPROMISE**

Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data enabling continued access to the Network Device and its critical data. The compromise of credentials include replacing existing credentials with an attacker's credentials, modifying existing credentials, or obtaining the Administrator or device credentials for use by the attacker.

### **T.PASSWORD\_CRACKING**

Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak administrative passwords to gain privileged access to the device. Having privileged access to the device provides the attacker unfettered access to the network traffic and may allow them to take advantage of any trust relationships with other Network Devices.

### **T.SECURITY\_FUNCTIONALITY\_FAILURE**

An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed or compromised security functionality and might therefore subsequently use or abuse security functions without prior authentication to access, change or modify device data, critical network traffic or security functionality of the device.

### **T.UNTRUSTED\_COMMUNICATION**

Untrusted intermediate systems have access to provide unauthorized communications to the TOE, or to manipulate authorized TLS messages in an attempt to compromise the TOE, the monitored clients, or the requested servers. Within this PP-Module, the focus is on an adversary that controls or exploits a requested server that may attempt to cause the device to inappropriately bypass inspection.

Use of weak cryptography can allow adversary access to plaintext intended by the monitored clients to be encrypted. Such access could disclose user passwords that facilitate additional activities against users of monitored clients. Within this PP-Module, the focus is on the use of weak cryptography and adversary attempts to degrade the cryptographic operations within the TLS protocol.

External network security devices may communicate with the TOE to apply security services to the exposed plaintext. An adversary may attempt to gain access the plaintext via misrouting of traffic or manipulate the traffic in such a way as to cause unauthorized exposure, denial of service, or corruption of the underlying plaintext.

### **T.AUDIT**

Certificates issued by the device are trusted by monitored clients, and are required for analysis if traffic processed by the device causes the client to fail or become compromised. Unknown activity related to the issuance and use of certificates can allow an adversary to mask client exploits through or via the TOE, especially if the device fails before the incident can be understood. Unknown activity associated to routing configurations, communications with the TOE, as well as the decision to bypass inspection of traffic can allow an adversary to mask attempts to access monitored clients.

### **T.UNAUTHORIZED\_USERS**

In addition to managing administrative credentials, authorized users may have role restrictions to limit their access to the device's certification authority functionality. In addition to the threat of disclosure or modification of authorized user credentials to users without authorized access to the device, a user with limited access might attempt to extend their access by gaining access to other user's credentials.

### **T.CREDENTIALS**

In addition to device credentials used in protected communications, the device maintains a trusted certification authority signing key. A malicious user or flawed TOE implementation may cause the disclosure or unauthorized manipulation of the signing key which can result in unintended certificates, signed executables, or signed data that would be trusted by monitored clients. Any modification of the signing key can result in denial of service to inspection capabilities, or to the monitored clients.

## **T.SERVICES**

Manipulation of the device can result in issued certificates being used for unauthorized purposes or abuse of inspection services. An authorized user (AU) (or adversary able to gain access to AU credentials) can access or misuse device services, or disclose sensitive or security critical data.

## **T.DEVICE\_FAILURE**

Failure of the certification authority component can result in unauthorized or improperly constrained certificates, or the inability to properly manage the validity of issued certificates. Failure of routing traffic to inspection processing (internal or external) can result in unauthorized disclosure or modification of traffic, or denial of service to monitored clients.

## **T.UNAUTHORIZED\_DISCLOSURE**

In addition to general threats to network devices, the TOE controls access to sensitive data that is intended by the monitored client to be encrypted. A malicious user or flawed TOE implementation could cause data to be transmitted in cleartext for which a user has a reasonable expectation of confidentiality.

## **T.INAPPROPRIATE\_ACCESS**

Decryption services applied to traffic between monitored clients and unintended servers can violate privacy laws, or disclose unauthorized traffic to inspection processes. Certification authority signature applied to unauthorized data could facilitate adversary exploits of monitored clients.

## **3.3 Organisational Security Policies**

The TOE environment must include and comply with the following organizational security policies.

### **P.ACCESS\_BANNER**

The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any other appropriate information to which users consent by accessing the TOE.

### **P.AUTHORIZATION\_TO\_INSPECT**

The authority to inspect client traffic may be limited by law, regulation, or policies based on the monitored client, requested server, or nature of the traffic. The TOE may be required to additionally provide a consent to monitor notice for users whose traffic is inspected by the device, if the monitored client might not provide such a banner.

## **3.4 Assumptions**

The assumptions defined below are made on the operational environment to ensure that the security functionality defined in this ST can be provided by the TOE.

### **A.PHYSICAL\_PROTECTION**

The Network Device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere with the device's physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the cPP will not include any

requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP will not expect the product to defend against physical access to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device. For vNDs, this assumption applies to the physical platform on which the VM runs.

### **A.LIMITED\_FUNCTIONALITY**

The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general purpose computing. For example the device should not provide a computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking functionality).

In the case of vNDs, the VS is considered part of the TOE with only one vND instance for each physical hardware platform. The exception being where components of the distributed TOE run inside more than one virtual machine (VM) on a single VS. There are no other guest VMs on the physical platform providing non-Network Device functionality.

The assumed functionality of the TOE includes the behavior needed to satisfy the functional claims of STIPM.

### **A.NO\_THRU\_TRAFFIC\_PROTECTION**

The standard/generic Network Device does not provide any assurance regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it. The intent is for the Network Device to protect data that originates on or is destined to the device itself, to include administrative data and audit data. Traffic that is traversing the Network Device, destined for another network entity, is not covered by the NDcPP. It is assumed that this protection will be covered by cPPs and PP-Modules for particular types of Network Devices (e.g., firewall).

This assumption only applies to the interfaces of the TOE that are defined by the NDcPP and not STIPM.

### **A.TRUSTED\_ADMINISTRATOR**

The Security Administrator(s) for the Network Device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes being appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy and to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The Network Device is not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.

For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the TOE's trust store (aka 'root store', 'trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline verification).

The functional claims of STIPM offer a limited ability to protect against malicious administrators, which is not within the scope of the original assumption.

### **A.REGULAR\_UPDATES**

The Network Device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.

### **A.ADMIN\_CREDENTIALS\_SECURE**

The Administrator's credentials (private key) used to access the network device are protected by the platform on which they reside.

### **A.RESIDUAL\_INFORMATION**

The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g., cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords, etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment. Residual information is expanded to include information relevant to STIP operation (e.g. decrypted SSL/TLS payload, ephemeral keys).

#### **A.VS\_TRUSTED\_ADMINISTRATOR (applies to vNDs only)**

The Security Administrators for the VS are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes not interfering with the correct operation of the device. The Network Device is not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious VS Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.

#### **A.VS\_REGULAR\_UPDATES (applies to vNDs only)**

The VS software is assumed to be updated by the VS Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.

#### **A.VS\_ISOLATION (applies to vNDs only)**

For vNDs, it is assumed that the VS provides, and is configured to provide sufficient isolation between software running in VMs on the same physical platform. Furthermore, it is assumed that the VS adequately protects itself from software running inside VMs on the same physical platform.

#### **A.VS\_CORRECT\_CONFIGURATION (applies to vNDs only)**

For vNDs, it is assumed that the VS and VMs are correctly configured to support ND functionality implemented in VMs.

## 4 Security Objectives

This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the TOE's operating environment (i.e., security objectives addressed by the IT domain or by non-technical or procedural means).

### 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

The security objectives for the TOE are listed below.

#### **O.AUDIT\_LOSS\_RESPONSE**

The TOE will respond to possible loss of audit records when an audit trail cannot be written to by restricting auditable events.

#### **O.CERTIFICATES**

The TSF must ensure that certificates, certificate revocation lists, and certificate status information are valid.

#### **O.DISPLAY\_BANNER**

The TOE will display an advisory warning regarding use of the TOE.

#### **O.INTEGRITY\_PROTECTION**

The TOE will provide appropriate integrity protection for TSF data and software and any user data stored by the TOE.

#### **O.PERSISTENT\_KEY\_PROTECTION**

The TOE will provide appropriate confidentiality and access protection to persistent keys and security critical parameters stored by the TOE.

#### **O.PROTECTED\_COMMUNICATIONS**

The TOE will provide protected communication channels for administrators, other parts of a distributed TOE, and authorized IT entities. The TOE will protect data assets when they are being transmitted to and from the TOE, including through intervening untrusted components.

#### **O.RECOVERY**

The TOE will have the ability to store and recover to a previous state at the direction of the administrator (e.g., provide support for archival and recovery capabilities).

#### **O.RESIDUAL\_INFORMATION\_CLEARING**

The TOE will ensure that any data contained in a protected resource is not available when the resource is reallocated.

#### **O.SYSTEM\_MONITORING**

The TOE will provide the ability to generate audit data and send that data to an external IT entity. The TOE will record in audit records: date and time of action and the entity responsible for the action. The TOE will provide the ability to store and review certificate information.

#### **O.TOE\_ADMINISTRATION**

The TOE will provide mechanisms to ensure that only privileged users are able to log in and configure the TOE, and provide protections for logged-in users. The TOE will ensure that administrative responsibilities are separated across different roles in order to mitigate the impact of improper administrative activities or unauthorized administrative access.

#### **O.TRAFFIC\_MONITORING**

The TOE will provide a mechanism for processing SSL/TLS traffic. This mechanism requires the TOE to enforce a policy to process encrypted traffic, which results in the traffic being allowed, blocked, or decrypted for further inspection. This mechanism also requires the TOE to enforce a policy to process decrypted traffic, which may be inspected for unauthorized content either by the TOE itself or through an interface with an external inspection component.

## 4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

The security objectives for the operational environment are listed below.

### **OE.PHYSICAL**

Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is provided by the environment.

### **OE.NO\_GENERAL\_PURPOSE**

There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other than those services necessary for the operation, administration and support of the TOE. Note: For vNDs the TOE includes only the contents of the its own VM, and does not include other VMs or the VS.

### **OE.NO\_THRU\_TRAFFIC\_PROTECTION**

The TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that traverses it. It is assumed that protection of this traffic will be covered by other security and assurance measures in the operational environment.

This operational environment security objective only applies to the interfaces of the TOE that are defined by the NDcPP and not STIPM.

### **OE.TRUSTED\_ADMIN**

Security Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all guidance documentation in a trusted manner. For vNDs, this includes the VS Administrator responsible for configuring the VMs that implement ND functionality.

For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are assumed to monitor the revocation status of all certificates in the TOE's trust store and to remove any certificate from the TOE's trust store in case such certificate can no longer be trusted.

STIPM also allows for the enforcement of administrative role separation, which can be used to limit the impact of malicious use of the TOE.

### **OE.UPDATES**

The TOE firmware and software is updated by an administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.

### **OE.ADMIN\_CREDENTIALS\_SECURE**

The administrator's credentials (private key) used to access the TOE must be protected on any other platform on which they reside.

### **OE.RESIDUAL\_INFORMATION**

The Security Administrator ensures that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment. For vNDs, this applies when the physical platform on which the VM runs is removed from its operational environment.



Residual information is expanded to include information relevant to STIP operation (e.g. decrypted SSL/TLS payload, ephemeral keys).

### **OE.VM\_CONFIGURATION (applies to vNDs only)**

For vNDs, the Security Administrator ensures that the VS and VMs are configured to

- reduce the attack surface of VMs as much as possible while supporting ND functionality (e.g., remove unnecessary virtual hardware, turn off unused inter-VM communications mechanisms), and
- correctly implement ND functionality (e.g., ensure virtual networking is properly configured to support network traffic, management channels, and audit reporting).

The VS should be operated in a manner that reduces the likelihood that vND operations are adversely affected by virtualisation features such as cloning, save/restore, suspend/resume, and live migration.

If possible, the VS should be configured to make use of features that leverage the VS's privileged position to provide additional security functionality. Such features could include malware detection through VM introspection, measured VM boot, or VM snapshot for forensic analysis.

### **OE.AUDIT**

The operational environment includes an audit server with adequate storage to retain the audit record, and the audit server provides adequate availability, integrity, and access control to the audit record to support operational requirements. Administration of the audit server is separate from that of the SSL/TLS inspection proxy, and can support all required role separations.

### **OE.CERT\_REPOSITORY**

The OE provides a certificate repository for storage of certificates (and optionally CRLs) issued by the TSF.

### **OE.CERT\_REPOSITORY\_SEARCH**

The OE provides the ability to search a certificate repository for specific certificate fields in certificates issued by the TSF and return the certificate and an identifier for the certificate that can be used to search the audit trail for events related to that certificate and for unauthorized or improperly constrained certificates.

## 5 Extended Components Definition

All of the extended components used in this ST are taken from the NDcPP or STIPM .

The NDcPP defines the following extended security functional requirements (SFRs) claimed in this ST. Refer to the NDcPP for the definition of these extended SFRs since they are not redefined in this ST.

### Security Audit (FAU)

FAU\_STG\_EXT.1

FAU\_STG\_EXT.3/LocSpace

### Cryptographic Support (FCS)

FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1

FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1

FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1

FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1

FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2

FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1

### Identification and Authentication (FIA)

FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1

FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1

FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2

FIA\_X509\_EXT.1/Rev

FIA\_X509\_EXT.2

FIA\_X509\_EXT.3

### Protection of the TSF (FPT)

FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1

FPT\_APW\_EXT.1

FPT\_STM\_EXT.1

FPT\_TST\_EXT.1/PowerOn

FPT\_TST\_EXT.1/OnDemand

FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1

### TOE Access (FTA)

FTA\_SSL\_EXT.1

The STIPM defines the following extended security functional requirements (SFRs) claimed in this ST. Refer to the STIPM for the definition of these extended SFRs since they are not redefined in this ST.

### Security Audit (FAU)

FAU\_GCR\_EXT.1

### Cryptographic Support (FCS)

FCS\_STG\_EXT.1

FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.1

FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.4

FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.5

FCS\_TTTS\_EXT.1

FCS\_TTTS\_EXT.4

User Data Protection (FDP)

FDP\_CER\_EXT.1

FDP\_CER\_EXT.2

FDP\_CER\_EXT.3

FDP\_CSIR\_EXT.1

FDP\_PPP\_EXT.1

FDP\_PRC\_EXT.1

FDP\_STG\_EXT.1

FDP\_STIP\_EXT.1

FDP\_TEP\_EXT.1

Identification and Authentication (FIA)

FIA\_ENR\_EXT.1

FIA\_X509\_EXT.1/STIP

FIA\_X509\_EXT.2/STIP

Protection of the TSF (FPT)

FPT\_KST\_EXT.1

FPT\_KST\_EXT.2

## 6 Security Requirements

The security requirements that are levied on the TOE are specified in this section of the ST. Each of them is drawn from the NDcPP or STIPM.

TOE Security Functional Requirements (from CC Part 2)		NDcPP, STIPM, or Both
FAU_GEN.1	Audit Data Generation	NDcPP
FAU_GEN.1/STIP	Audit Data Generation (STIP)	STIPM
FAU_GEN.2	User Identity Association	NDcPP
FAU_STG.1	Protected Audit Trail Storage	NDcPP
FAU_STG.4	Prevention of Audit Data Loss	STIPM
FCS_CKM.1	Cryptographic Key Generation	NDcPP
FCS_CKM.2	Cryptographic Key Establishment	NDcPP
FCS_CKM.4	Cryptographic Key Destruction	Both
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)	NDcPP
FCS_COP.1/SigGen	Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)	NDcPP
FCS_COP.1/Hash	Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)	NDcPP
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)	NDcPP
FCS_COP.1/STIP	Cryptographic Operation (Data Encryption/Decryption in Support of STIP)	STIPM
FDP_RIP.1	Subset Residual Information Protection	STIPM
FIA_AFL.1	Authentication Failure Management	NDcPP
FIA_UAU.7	Protected Authentication Feedback	NDcPP
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate	Management of Security Functions Behaviour/ManualUpdate	NDcPP
FMT_MOF.1/Services	Management of Security Functions Behaviour/Services	NDcPP
FMT_MOF.1/STIP	Management of Security Functions Behaviour/STIP	STIPM
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData	Management of TSF Data/CoreData	NDcPP
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys	Management of TSF Data/CryptoKeys	NDcPP
FMT_SMF.1	Specification of Management Functions	NDcPP
FMT_SMF.1/STIP	Specification of Management Functions (STIP)	STIPM
FMT_SMR.2	Restrictions on Security Roles	NDcPP
FMT_SMR.2/STIP	Restrictions on Security Roles (STIP)	STIPM
FPT_FLS.1	Failure with Preservation of Secure State	STIPM
FPT_RCV.1	Manual Trust Recovery	STIPM
FTA_SSL.3	TSF-initiated Termination	NDcPP
FTA_SSL.4	User-initiated Termination	NDcPP
FTA_TAB.1	Default TOE Access Banners	NDcPP
FTP_ITC.1	Inter-TSF Trusted Channel	NDcPP
FTP_TRP.1/Admin	Trusted Path	NDcPP
Extended Security Functional Requirements		
FAU_GCR_EXT.1	Generation of Certificate Repository	STIPM
FAU_STG_EXT.1	Protected Audit Event Storage	NDcPP
FAU_STG_EXT.3/LocSpace	Display Warning for Local Storage Space	NDcPP
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1	HTTPS Protocol	NDcPP
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	Random Bit Generation	NDcPP
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	SSH Server Protocol	NDcPP
FCS_STG_EXT.1	Cryptographic Key Storage	STIPM
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1[1]-[2]	TLS Client Protocol Without Mutual Authentication	NDcPP

FCS_TLSC_EXT.2	TLS Client Protocol for Mutual Authentication	NDcPP
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1[1]-[4]	TLS Server Protocol Without Mutual Authentication	NDcPP
FCS_TTTC_EXT.1	Thru-Traffic TLS Inspection Client Protocol	STIPM
FCS_TTTC_EXT.4	STIP Client-Side Support for Renegotiation	STIPM
FCS_TTTC_EXT.5	Thru-Traffic TLS Inspection Client Support for Supported Groups Extension	STIPM
FCS_TTTS_EXT.1	Thru-Traffic TLS Inspection Server Protocol	STIPM
FCS_TTTS_EXT.4	STIP Server-Side Support for Renegotiation	STIPM
FDP_CER_EXT.1	Certificate Profiles for Server Certificates	STIPM
FDP_CER_EXT.2	Certificate Request Matching of Server Certificates	STIPM
FDP_CER_EXT.3	Certificate Issuance Rules for Server Certificates	STIPM
FDP_CSIR_EXT.1	Certificate Status Information Required	STIPM
FDP_PPP_EXT.1	Plaintext Processing Policy	STIPM
FDP_PRC_EXT.1	Plaintext Routing Control	STIPM
FDP_STG_EXT.1	Certificate Data Storage	STIPM
FDP_STIP_EXT.1	SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy Functions	STIPM
FDP_TEP_EXT.1	SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy Policy	STIPM
FIA_ENR_EXT.1	Certificate Enrollment	STIPM
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	Password Management	NDcPP
FIA_UIA_EXT.1	User Identification and Authentication	NDcPP
FIA_UAU_EXT.2	Password-based Authentication Mechanism	NDcPP
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev	X.509 Certificate Validation	Both
FIA_X509_EXT.1/STIP	Certificate Validation (STIP)	Both
FIA_X509_EXT.2	X.509 Certificate Authentication	NDcPP
FIA_X509_EXT.2/STIP	X.509 Certificate Authentication (STIP)	STIPM
FIA_X509_EXT.3	X.509 Certificate Requests	Both
FPT_APW_EXT.1	Protection of Administrator Passwords	NDcPP
FPT_KST_EXT.1	No Plaintext Key Export	STIPM
FPT_KST_EXT.2	TSF Key Protection	STIPM
FPT_SKP_EXT.1	Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric, and private keys)	NDcPP
FPT_STM_EXT.1	Reliable Time Stamps	NDcPP
FPT_TST_EXT.1/ PowerOn	TSF Testing	NDcPP
FPT_TST_EXT.1/ OnDemand	TSF Testing	NDcPP
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Trusted Update	NDcPP
FTA_SSL_EXT.1	TSF-initiated Session Locking	NDcPP

**Table 3: Security Functional Requirements**

## 6.1 Conventions

The CC defines four operations on security functional requirements. The SFRs claimed in this ST have all been drawn from the NDcPP and STIPM. The CC operations already performed in the NDcPP and STIPM are reproduced in plain text and not denoted in this ST. Instead, the requirements have been copied from the NDcPP and STIPM and any remaining operations have been completed herein. The NDcPP and STIPM made refinements and SFR operations defined in the Common Criteria (CC) and the PPs should be consulted to identify those operations. The conventions below define the denotations used in this ST to identify the operations completed in this ST by the ST author.

*Assignment made in ST:* indicated with *italics text*

Selection made in ST: indicated with underlined text

**Refinement made in ST:** additions indicated **with bold text**  
 deletions indicated with ~~strikethrough text~~

Iteration made in ST: indicated with typical CC requirement naming followed by an iteration number in brackets, e.g., [1], [2], [3].

## 6.2 Security Functional Requirements

### 6.2.1 Security Audit (FAU)

#### 6.2.1.1 FAU\_GCR\_EXT.1 Generation of Certificate Repository

**FAU\_GCR\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall invoke the Operational Environment to store certificates issued by the TSF.

#### 6.2.1.2 FAU\_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation

**FAU\_GEN.1.1** The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a) Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions;
- b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
- c) All administrative actions comprising:
  - Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual user accounts are required for administrators).
  - Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the information that a change occurred it shall be logged what has been changed).
  - Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to the action itself a unique key name or key reference shall be logged).
  - Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged).
  - *Starting and stopping services;*
- d) Specifically defined auditable events listed in ~~Table 2~~ **Table 4**.

**FAU\_GEN.1.2** The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the cPP/ST, *information specified in column three of* ~~Table 2~~ **Table 4**.

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
FAU_GEN.1	None.	None.
FAU_GEN.2	None.	None.
FAU_STG.1	None.	None.
FAU_STG_EXT.1	None.	None.
FAU_STG_EXT.3/LocSpace	Low storage space for audit events.	None.
FCS_CKM.1	None.	None.
FCS_CKM.2	None.	None.
FCS_CKM.4	None.	None.
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	None.	None.

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
FCS COP.1/SigGen	None.	None.
FCS COP.1/Hash	None.	None.
FCS COP.1/KeyedHash	None.	None.
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1	Failure to establish a HTTPS Session	Reason for failure.
FCS RBG_EXT.1	None.	None.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	Failure to establish an SSH Session	Reason for failure.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.1[1]-[2]	Failure to establish a TLS Session	Reason for failure.
FCS_TLSC_EXT.2	Failure to establish a TLS Session	Reason for failure.
FCS_TLSS_EXT.1[1]-[4]	Failure to establish a TLS Session	Reason for failure.
FIA_AFL.1	Unsuccessful login attempt limits is met or exceeded.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address)
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	None.	None.
FIA_UIA_EXT.1	All use of identification and authentication mechanism.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_UAU_EXT.2	All use of identification and authentication mechanism.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_UAU.7	None.	None.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Unsuccessful attempt to validate a certificate</li> <li>Any addition, replacement or removal of trust anchors in the TOE's trust store.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reason for failure of certificate validation</li> <li>Identification of certificates added, replaced or removed as trust anchor in the TOE's trust store</li> </ul>
FIA_X509_EXT.2	None	None
FIA_X509_EXT.3	None.	None.
FMT_MOF.1/Services	None.	None.
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate	Any attempt to initiate a manual update	None.
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData	None.	None.
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys	None	None.
FMT_SMF.1	All management activities of TSF data.	None.
FMT_SMR.2	None.	None.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1	None.	None.
FPT_APW_EXT.1	None.	None.
FPT_TST_EXT.1/PowerOn	None.	None.
FPT_TST_EXT.1/OnDemand	None.	None.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Initiation of update; result of the update attempt (success or failure)	None.
FPT_STM_EXT.1	Discontinuous changes to time – either Administrator actuated or changed via an automated process. (Note that no continuous changes to time need to be logged. See also	For discontinuous changes to time: The old and new values for the time. Origin of the attempt to change time for

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
	application note on FPT STM EXT.1 in the NDcPP.	success and failure (e.g., IP address).
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 (if “terminate the session” is selected)	The termination of a local session by the session locking mechanism.	None.
FTA_SSL.3	The termination of a remote session by the session locking mechanism.	None.
FTA_SSL.4	The termination of an interactive session.	None.
FTA_TAB.1	None.	None.
FTP_ITC.1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Initiation of the trusted channel.</li> <li>Termination of the trusted channel.</li> <li>Failure of the trusted channel functions</li> </ul>	Identification of the initiator and target of failed trusted channels establishment attempt.
FTP_TRP.1/Admin	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Initiation of the trusted path.</li> <li>Termination of the trusted path.</li> <li>Failure of the trusted path functions.</li> </ul>	None.

**Table 4: NDcPP Security Functional Requirements and Auditable Events**

**6.2.1.3 FAU\_GEN.1/STIP Audit Data Generation (STIP)**

**FAU\_GEN.1.1/STIP** The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a) Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions;
- b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
- c) auditable events defined in ~~Auditable Events for Mandatory Requirements table Table 5,~~
- d) applicable auditable events defined in ~~Auditable Events for Selection-based Requirements table Table 5.~~

**FAU\_GEN.1.2/STIP** The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST,
- c) additional information defined in ~~Auditable Events for Mandatory Requirements table Table 5,~~
- d) additional information defined in applicable auditable events in ~~Auditable Events for Selection-based Requirements table Table 5,~~
- e) additional information defined in ~~Auditable Events table Table 5~~ for each auditable event, where applicable.

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
FAU_GCR_EXT.1	None.	None.
FAU_STG.4	None.	None.



Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
FCS COP.1/STIP	None.	None.
FCS STG_EXT.1	None.	None.
FCS TTTC_EXT.1	Establishment of TLS session	TLS session parameters
FCS TTTC_EXT.4	None.	None.
FCS TTTC_EXT.5	None.	None.
FCS TTTS_EXT.1	Establishment of TLS session	TLS session parameters
FCS TTTS_EXT.4	None.	None.
FDP CER_EXT.1	None.	None.
FDP_CER_EXT.2	Linking of issued certificate to validated certificate	Success: <u>issued certificate value</u> , <u>issued certificate object identifier</u> , <u>validated certificate value</u> , <u>validated certificate object identifier</u>  Failure: Reason for failure
FDP_CER_EXT.3	Certificate generation	Success: <u>Certificate value</u> , <u>certificate object identifier</u>
FDP_CSIR_EXT.1	None.	None.
FDP_PPP_EXT.1	Configuration changes to the plaintext processing policy	None.
FDP_PRC_EXT.1	Plaintext routed to inspection processing functional component	TLS Session Thread identifier, <i>Connector virtual server name</i>
FDP RIP.1	None.	None.
FDP_STG_EXT.1	None.	None.
FDP_STIP_EXT.1	Establishment of a TLS inspection session thread	<i>Client side SID, server side SID, Client SSL ciphers, Client TLS version, Server SSL ciphers, Server TLS version</i> associated to the thread
	Establishment of an encrypted TLS data flow	<i>Client side SID, server side SID, Client SSL ciphers, Client TLS version, Server SSL ciphers, Server TLS version</i>
	Bypass operation invoked	TLS session thread identifier, identifier(s) of processing element(s) bypassed, reason for bypass
	Block operation involved	TLS Session Thread identifier, reason for blocking
FDP_TEP_EXT.1	Mutual authentication authorized	<i>Client certificate hash, Client DN</i>
FIA_ENR_EXT.1	None.	None.
FIA_X509_EXT.1/STIP	None.	None.
FIA_X509_EXT.2/STIP	None.	None.
FMT_MOF.1/STIP	None.	None.
FMT_SMF.1/STIP	None.	None.
FMT_SMR.2/STIP	None.	None.
FPT_FLS.1	Invocation of failures under this requirement	Indication that the TSF has failed with the type of failure that occurred

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
FPT_KST_EXT.1	None.	None.
FPT_KST_EXT.2	All attempts to use the TOE's embedded CA's private signing key, and <u>no other secret and private keys</u>	Identifier of user or process that attempted access
FPT_RCV.1	The fact that a failure or service discontinuity occurred	None.
	Resumption of the regular operation	TSF failure types that are available on recovery

**Table 5: STIP Security Functional Requirements and Auditable Events**

#### **6.2.1.4 FAU\_GEN.2 User Identity Association**

**FAU\_GEN.2.1** For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.

#### **6.2.1.5 FAU\_STG.1 Protected Audit Trail Storage**

**FAU\_STG.1.1** The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion.

**FAU\_STG.1.2** The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.

#### **6.2.1.6 FAU\_STG.4 Prevention of Audit Data Loss**

**FAU\_STG.4.1** The TSF shall prevent audited events, except those taken by the Security Administrator and *no other actions to be taken in the case of audit storage failure* if the audit trail cannot be written to.

#### **6.2.1.7 FAU\_STG\_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage**

**FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel according to FTP\_ITC.1.

**FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself. In addition

- The TOE shall consist of a single standalone component that stores audit data locally.

**FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall overwrite previous audit records according to the following rule: log files are numbered and the oldest log file is deleted when the local storage space for audit data is full.

#### **6.2.1.8 FAU\_STG\_EXT.3/LocSpace Action in case of possible audit data loss**

**FAU\_STG\_EXT.3.1/LocSpace** The TSF shall generate a warning to inform the Administrator before the audit trail exceeds the local audit trail storage capacity.

### **6.2.2 Cryptographic Operations (FCS)**

#### **6.2.2.1 FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation**

**FCS\_CKM.1.1** The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm:

- RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3;
- ECC schemes using “NIST curves” P-256, P-384 that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4;  
~~and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].~~

*Application Note: The TOE generates RSA keys with 2048 and 3072 key sizes.*

### 6.2.2.2 FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment

**FCS\_CKM.2.1** The TSF shall perform cryptographic key establishment in accordance with a specified cryptographic key establishment method:

- RSA-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: RSAES-PKCS1-v1\_5 as specified in Section 7.2 of RFC 3447, “Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1”;
- Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”;  
~~that meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].~~

### 6.2.2.3 FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction

**FCS\_CKM.4.1** The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys and critical security parameters, when no longer required in accordance with the specified cryptographic key destruction method

- For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a single overwrite consisting of zeroes;
- For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by the invocation of an interface provided by a part of the TSF that
  - when not in the EEPROM, logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a single overwrite consisting of zeroes
  - when in EEPROM on F5 Devices and vCMP, logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a single overwrite consisting of random data

that meets the following: no standard.

### 6.2.2.4 FCS\_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)

**FCS\_COP.1.1/DataEncryption** The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in CBC, CTR, GCM mode and cryptographic key sizes 128 bits, 256 bits that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, CBC as specified in ISO 10116, CTR as specified in ISO 10116, GCM as specified in ISO 19772.

### 6.2.2.5 FCS\_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic operation (Signature Generation and Verification)

**FCS\_COP.1.1/SigGen** The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm

- RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes (modulus) 2048, 3072 bits,
- Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes 256, 384 bits

that meet the following:

- For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1\_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3,
- For ECDSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 6 and Appendix D, Implementing “NIST curves” P-256, P-384; ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section 6.4

#### 6.2.2.6 FCS\_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic operation (Hash Operation)

**FCS\_COP.1.1/Hash** The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] and message digest sizes 160, 256, 384 bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.

#### 6.2.2.7 FCS\_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)

**FCS\_COP.1.1/KeyedHash** The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384 and cryptographic key sizes *for SHA-1 the key size is  $\geq 160$  bits, for SHA-256 the key size is  $\geq 256$  bits, for SHA-384 the key size is  $\geq 384$  bits used in HMAC* and message digest sizes 160, 256, 384 bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”.

#### 6.2.2.8 FCS\_COP.1/STIP Cryptographic operation (Data Encryption/Decryption in Support of STIP)

**FCS\_COP.1.1/STIP** The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithms AES in CCM and CCM-8 mode and no other algorithms and cryptographic key sizes 128 bits, 256 bits that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, CCM and CCM-8 as specified in NIST SP 800-38C and no other standards.

#### 6.2.2.9 FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1 HTTPS Protocol

**FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall implement the HTTPS protocol that complies with RFC 2818.

**FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall implement HTTPS using TLS.

**FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1.3** If a peer certificate is presented, the TSF shall not establish the connection if the peer certificate is deemed invalid.

#### 6.2.2.10 FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using CTR\_DRBG (AES).

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2** The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from two software-based noise source, two platform-based noise source for the F5 devices except 10000 series, one platform-based noise source for 10000 series F5 devices, one platform-based noise source for the

**VCMP guest platforms** with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

### **6.2.2.11 FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol**

**FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 5656, 6668, 8332.

**FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following user authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, password-based.

**FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than 256\*1024 bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.

**FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: aes128-cbc, aes256-cbc, aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr.

**FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.5** The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms.

**FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.6** The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256 as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).

**FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.7** The TSF shall ensure that ecdh-sha2-nistp256 and ecdh-sha2-nistp384 are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.

**FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.8** The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and each encryption key is used to protect no more than one gigabyte of data. After any of the thresholds are reached a rekey needs to be performed.

Application Note: [TD0631](#) applies to this SFR definition.

### **6.2.2.12 FCS\_STG\_EXT.1 Cryptographic Key Storage**

**FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.1** Persistent private and secret keys shall be stored within the TSF using *F5 Secure Vault*.

### **6.2.2.13 FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1[1] TLS Client Protocol without mutual authentication (TLS1.1)**

**FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.1[1]** The **data plane of the** TSF shall implement TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites:

- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 4492.

**FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.2[1]** The **data plane of the** TSF shall verify that the presented identifier

matches Ipv4 address in CN or SAN.

**FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.3[1]** When establishing a trusted channel, by default the **data plane of the** TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also

- Not implement any administrator override mechanism

**FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.4[1]** The **data plane of the** TSF shall present the Supported Elliptic Curves/Supported Groups Extension with the following curves/groups: secp256r1, secp384r1 and no other curves/groups in the Client Hello.

#### **6.2.2.14 FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1[2] TLS Client Protocol without mutual authentication (TLS 1.2)**

**FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.1[2]** The **data plane of the** TSF shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites:

- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289.

**FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.2[2]** The **data plane of the** TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches Ipv4 address in CN or SAN.

**FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.3[2]** When establishing a trusted channel, by default the **data plane of the** TSF shall not establish a trusted channel if the server certificate is invalid. The TSF shall also

- Not implement any administrator override mechanism

**FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1.4[2]** The **data plane of the** TSF shall present the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension with the following NIST curves: secp256r1, secp384r1 and no other curves in the Client Hello.

#### **6.2.2.15 FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2 TLS Client support for mutual authentication**

**FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2.1** The **data plane of the** TSF shall support TLS communication with mutual authentication using X.509v3 certificates.

#### **6.2.2.16 FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1[1] TLS Server Protocol (Data Plane Server – TLS 1.1)**

**FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1.1[1]** The **data plane of the** TSF shall implement TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites:

- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 4492.

**FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1.2[1]** The **data plane of the** TSF shall deny connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, and none.

**FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1.3[1]** The **data plane of the** TSF shall perform key establishment for TLS using RSA with key size 2048 bits, 3072 bits, ECDHE curves secp256r1 and secp384r1 and no other curves.

**FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1.4[1]** The **data plane of the** TSF shall support session resumption based on session tickets according to RFC 5077.

#### **6.2.2.17 FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1[2] TLS Server Protocol (Data Plane Server – TLS 1.2)**

**FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1.1[2]** The **data plane of the** TSF shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites:

- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 3268
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289

- TLS ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289.

**FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1.2[2]** The **data plane of the** TSF shall deny connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, and none.

**FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1.3[2]** The **data plane of the** TSF shall perform key establishment for TLS using RSA with key size 2048 bits, 3072 bits, ECDHE curves secp256r1 and secp384r1 and no other curves.

**FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1.4[2]** The **data plane of the** TSF shall support session resumption based on session tickets according to RFC 5077.

#### **6.2.2.18 FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1[3] TLS Server Protocol (Control Plane Server – TLS 1.1)**

**FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1.1[3]** The **control plane of the** TSF shall implement TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites:

- TLS ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 4492.

**FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1.2[3]** The **control plane of the** TSF shall deny connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, and none.

**FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1.3[3]** The **control plane of the** TSF shall perform key establishment for TLS using RSA with key size 2048 bits, 3072 bits, ECDHE curves secp256r1 and secp384r1 and no other curves.

**FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1.4[3]** The **control plane of the** TSF shall support session resumption based on session tickets according to RFC 5077.

#### **6.2.2.19 FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1[4] TLS Server Protocol (Control Plane Server – TLS 1.2)**

**FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1.1[4]** The **control plane of the** TSF shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246) and reject all other TLS and SSL versions. The TLS implementation will support the following ciphersuites:

- TLS ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 4492
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289



- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288.

**FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1.2[4]** The **control plane of the** TSF shall deny connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, and none.

**FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1.3[4]** The **control plane of the** TSF shall perform key establishment for TLS using RSA with key size 2048 bits, 3072 bits, ECDHE curves secp256r1 and secp384r1 and no other curves.

**FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1.4[4]** The **control plane of the** TSF shall support session resumption based on session tickets according to RFC 5077.

#### **6.2.2.20 FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.1 Thru-Traffic TLS Inspection Client Protocol**

**FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246), TLS 1.0 (RFC 2246), and TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) as a client to the requested server that supports the following cipher suites:

- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS\_ECDH\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDH\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CCM as defined in RFC 6655
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CCM as defined in RFC 6655
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM as defined in RFC 6655

- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS\_ECDH\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDH\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDH\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM as defined in RFC 6655
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 8422
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 8422
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS\_ECDH\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 8422
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 8422
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 8422
- TLS\_ECDH\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 8422
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM\_8 as defined in RFC 6655
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM\_8 as defined in RFC 6655
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CCM\_8 as defined in RFC 6655
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CCM\_8 as defined in RFC 6655
- no other cipher suites

and also supports functionality for

- session renegotiation.

**FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall verify that the presented identifier matches the reference identifier of the server requested by the monitored client using methods described in RFC 6125 section 6 for DNS name types, and via exact, byte-by-byte matching for IP address name types.

**FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall validate the certificate presented by the server and terminate the connection if the certificate is invalid, except as allowed by FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.2/STIP.

**FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall formulate the Client Hello such that it presents the highest version of the TLS protocol supported by the proxy function in the version field, and presents the list of cipher suites in descending order of preference associated with requested server.

### **6.2.2.21 FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.4 STIP Client-Side Support for Renegotiation**

**FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.4.1** The TSF shall support secure renegotiation on STIP TLS connections through use of the “renegotiation\_info” TLS extension in accordance with RFC 5746.

**FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.4.2** The TSF shall include TLS\_EMPTY\_RENEGOTIATION\_INFO\_SCSV cipher suite in the Client Hello message.

**FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.4.3** The TSF shall ensure that renegotiation is performed before SSL profile specifies renegotiation period and/or size.

### **6.2.2.22 FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.5 Thru-Traffic TLS Inspection Client Support for Supported Groups Extension**

**FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.5.1** The TSF shall present the Supported Groups Extension in the Client Hello with the supported groups:

- secp256r1
- secp384r1
- ffdhe2048(256)
- ffdhe3072(257)
- ffdhe4096(258).

### **6.2.2.23 FCS\_TTTS\_EXT.1 Thru-Traffic TLS Inspection Server Protocol**

**FCS\_TTTS\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall implement TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246), TLS 1.0 (RFC 2246), and TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) as a server to the monitored client that supports the following cipher suites:

- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5288
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS\_ECDH\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDH\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CCM as defined in RFC 6655
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CCM as defined in RFC 6655
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289

- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM as defined in RFC 6655
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS\_ECDH\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDH\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_ECDH\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM as defined in RFC 6655
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5288
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 8422
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 8422
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS\_ECDH\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 8422
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 8422
- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 8422
- TLS\_ECDH\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 8422
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA as defined in RFC 5246
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM\_8 as defined in RFC 6655
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM\_8 as defined in RFC 6655
- TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CCM\_8 as defined in RFC 6655
- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CCM\_8 as defined in RFC 6655
- no other cipher suites

and also supports functionality for

- session renegotiation

**FCS\_TTTS\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall deny connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, and no other SSL or TLS versions for through-traffic processing.

**FCS\_TTTS\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall perform key establishment for TLS with a monitored client using

- RSA with key size 2048 bits, 3072 bits;
- Diffie-Hellman groups ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096
- EC Diffie-Hellman parameters using elliptic curves secp256r1, secp384r1 and no other curves.

#### **6.2.2.24 FCS\_TTTS\_EXT.4 STIP Server-Side Support for Renegotiation**

**FCS\_TTTS\_EXT.4.1** The TSF shall support the “renegotiation\_info” TLS extension in accordance with RFC 5746.

**FCS\_TTTS\_EXT.4.2** The TSF shall include the renegotiation\_info extension in Server Hello messages.

### **6.2.3 User Data Protection (FDP)**

#### **6.2.3.1 FDP\_CER\_EXT.1 Certificate Profiles for Server Certificates**

**FDP\_CER\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall implement a certificate profile function for TLS server certificates issued by a CA embedded within the TOE, and shall ensure that issued certificates are consistent with configured profiles.

**FDP\_CER\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall generate certificates using profiles that comply with requirements for certificates as specified in IETF RFC 5280, “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile” as refined below. At a minimum, the TSF shall ensure that:

- a) The version field shall contain the integer 2
- b) The issuerUniqueID or subjectUniqueID fields are not populated.
- c) The serialNumber shall be unique with respect to the issuing Certification Authority.
- d) The validity field shall specify a notBefore value that does not precede the current time and a notAfter value that does not precede the value specified in notBefore.
- e) The issuer field is not empty and is populated with the Security Administrator-configured CA name.
- f) The signature field and the algorithm in the subjectPublicKeyInfo field shall contain the OID for a signature algorithm specified in FCS\_COP.1/SigGen in the NDcPP.
- g) The following extensions are supported:
  - a. authorityKeyIdentifier
  - b. keyUsage
  - c. extendedKeyUsage
  - d. certificatePolicy
  - e. authorityInfoAccess
- h) A subject field containing a null Name (e.g., a sequence of zero relative distinguished names) is accompanied by a populated critical subjectAltName extension.
- i) The authorityKeyIdentifier extension in any certificate issued by the TOE must be populated and must be the same as the subjectKeyIdentifier extension contained in the TOE’s embedded CA’s signing certificate.
- j) Populated keyUsage and extendedKeyUsage fields in the same certificate shall contain consistent values reflecting exclusive TLS server use as follows:

keyUsage	extendedKeyUsage
digitalSignature	serverAuth
digital Signature, keyEncipherment	serverAuth
digital Signature, keyAgreement	serverAuth

k) no other constraints.

**FDP\_CER\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall implement the following rules for populating certificate fields based on constraints imposed by the TOE's embedded CA's signing certificate:

- The validity field shall specify a notAfter time that does not exceed the notAfter time of the CA's signing certificate.
- The issuer field identifies the subject of the CA's signing certificate.
- no other rules.

**FDP\_CER\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall implement the following rules for populating certificate fields based on the validated certificate and constraints imposed by the Security Administrator:

- a) The Subject/Subject Alternative Name shall be copied from validated server certificate.
- b) The notBefore field shall not precede the notBefore field of the validated server certificate.
- c) The notAfter field shall not exceed the notAfter field of the validated server certificate.
- d) The notAfter field shall not exceed the current time by more than a maximum validity duration value as configured by a Security Administrator user.
- e) If the basicConstraints field is configured to be present, it shall be populated with the value cA=False.
- f) The subject public key shall be generated in accordance with FCS\_CKM.1.1 in the NDcPP.
- g) no additional rules.

### **6.2.3.2 FDP\_CER\_EXT.2 Certificate Request Matching of Server Certificates**

**FDP\_CER\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall establish and record a linkage from validated certificates to issued certificates.

### **6.2.3.3 FDP\_CER\_EXT.3 Certificate Issuance Rules for Server Certificates**

**FDP\_CER\_EXT.3.1** The TSF shall issue certificates in response to a validated server certificate according to the following rules: The issued certificate is in compliance with a current certificate profile defined in accordance with FDP\_CER\_EXT.1 and

- The TLS session establishment policy is configured to allow inspection of TLS sessions between monitored clients and a requested server authenticated to the TSF by the validated certificate,
- A valid certificate for the same subject is not present in cache.

**FDP\_CER\_EXT.3.2** The TSF shall reject all certificate requests originating external to the TOE

### **6.2.3.4 FDP\_CSIR\_EXT.1 Certificate Status Information Required**

**FDP\_CSIR\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall only issue certificates with validity period of less than 24

hours.

### **6.2.3.5 FDP\_PPP\_EXT.1 Plaintext Processing Policy**

**FDP\_PPP\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall enforce the TLS plaintext processing policy on information flows containing plaintext produced by inspection processing of the TOE between TLS session termination points and internal inspection processing functional components and an interface to external inspection processing environment.

**FDP\_PPP\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall allow the definition of TLS plaintext processing policy rules using *destination address, destination port, TLS server certificate message attributes, no indicators of inspection processing results* and distinct interfaces.

**FDP\_PPP\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall allow the following operations to be associated with the plaintext processing policy: permit, block, and bypass, with the capability to log the operation.

**FDP\_PPP\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall allow the Plaintext Processing Policy to be applied at each information flow control point between inspection processing functional components, including any network interface used to support external inspection processing.

**FDP\_PPP\_EXT.1.5** The TSF shall

- drop Information flows between inspection processing components, including any interface to external inspection processing components, that cannot be associated to an existing TLS session thread.
- inform the TLS session establishment policy of the TLS session thread associated to any information flow that is blocked by the plaintext processing policy

### **6.2.3.6 FDP\_PRC\_EXT.1 Plaintext Routing Control**

**FDP\_PRC\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall control the routing of information flows containing plaintext within a TLS session thread in accordance with the configured Plaintext Processing Policy identified in FDP\_PPP\_EXT.1.

**FDP\_PRC\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall separate information flows containing plaintext within different TLS session threads.

**FDP\_PRC\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall not expose plaintext within a TLS session thread except to inspection processing functional components identified in, and as authorized by the configured Plaintext Processing Policy, as described in FDP\_PPP\_EXT.1.

### **6.2.3.7 FDP\_RIP.1 Subset Residual Information Protection**

**FDP\_RIP.1.1** The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the allocation of the resource to the following objects: *all objects.*

### **6.2.3.8 FDP\_STG\_EXT.1 Certificate Data Storage**

**FDP\_STG\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall use access controlled storage to protect the trusted public keys and certificates (trust store elements) used to validate local logon, trusted channel, and external communication to the STIP.

### **6.2.3.9 FDP\_STIP\_EXT.1 SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy Functions**

**FDP\_STIP\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall be capable of performing the Inspection Operation consisting

of establishing a TLS session between TOE and the requested server according to FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.1, establishing a TLS session between the monitored client and the TOE according to FCS\_TTTS\_EXT.1, and routing decrypted application data from either of these TLS sessions to or between inspection processing functional components within the TOE, or between the TOE and external inspection processing functional components to a unique TLS session thread, according to FDP\_PPP\_EXT.1 and FDP\_PRC\_EXT.1.

**FDP\_STIP\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall obtain a certificate from the TOE CA that represents the requested server for establishment of the TLS session with the monitored client when performing an inspect operation.

**FDP\_STIP\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall require administrator confirmation of consent prior to sending decrypted TLS application data from a monitored client to inspection processing functional component as part of an inspection operation.

**FDP\_STIP\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall provide the Bypass operation functionality by forwarding traffic between the monitored client and requested server such that monitored client can establish and maintain a TLS connection to the requested server.

**FDP\_STIP\_EXT.1.5** When initiating a Block operation, the TSF shall be capable of providing a TLS error response, block page to the monitored client associated with the blocked TLS session.

#### **6.2.3.10 FDP\_TEP\_EXT.1 SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy Policy**

**FDP\_TEP\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall perform SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy functions and enforce SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy rules on TLS traffic received by the TSF from monitored clients and servers requested by monitored clients, and on TLS traffic controlled by the TSF to be sent to monitored clients and servers requested by monitored clients.

**FDP\_TEP\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall allow the definition of SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy rules based on the following attributes of each monitored client and requested server:

- Network Protocol fields: Ipv4, Ipv6:
  - Source address
  - Destination address
  - Source Port
  - Destination Port
  - no other fields
- TLS Client Hello handshake message:
  - Server\_name extension of the requested server
  - Client side interface
- TLS Server Certificate message:
  - Issuer
  - Subject
  - SubjectAlternateName
- Distinct Interface
- no other attributes

**FDP\_TEP\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall allow the following operations to be associated with SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy rules: block, bypass, or inspect, with the capability to log the operation.



**FDP\_TEP\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall be able to define monitored clients, requested servers, and specific client-server connections in terms of the attributes associated with the SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy function.

**FDP\_TEP\_EXT.1.5** The TSF shall be able to associate a monitored client, requested server, and specific client-server connections with the allowed TLS version or versions, TLS cipher suites (including TLS key exchange algorithms and key sizes), the supported groups per FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.5.1, and mutual authentication block-bypass, requested server certificate revocation status unavailable that shall be used when performing the SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy operations.

**FDP\_TEP\_EXT.1.6** The TSF shall allow the SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy rules to be assigned to each distinct network interface.

**FDP\_TEP\_EXT.1.7** The TSF shall perform a block, bypass operation on the session when receiving a TLS certificate request message from the requested server when establishing the TLS in accordance with FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.1.

**FDP\_TEP\_EXT.1.8** The TSF shall

- Block the connection if the monitored client does not support a TLS version, cipher suite, key exchange, and key size that are in its allowed set as defined in FDP\_TEP\_EXT.1.5
- Block the connection if the requested server does not negotiate a TLS version, cipher suite, key exchange, and key size that are in its allowed set as defined in FDP\_TEP\_EXT.1.5
- Either block, or require administrative approval to inspect or bypass the connection if the requested server does not negotiate a TLS version, cipher suite, key exchange, and key size that are in the set proposed by the monitored client in its Client Hello message
- Block or inspect the connection if TOE certificate processing indicates revocation information is not available for a requested server or no other entity
- Block or no other rule a connection if TOE certificate processing indicates an uninterpretable critical extension is present in the certificate of a requested server.

**FDP\_TEP\_EXT.1.9** The TSF shall enforce the following default SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy rules on all SSL/TLS network traffic received from interfaces associated with monitored clients and requested servers:

- The TSF shall drop and be capable of logging invalid TLS messages
- The TSF shall drop and be capable of logging TLS Client Hello messages for which no valid client can be determined
- The TSF shall drop a TLS Client Hello message for which no valid server attribute can be determined
- The TSF shall drop and be capable of logging TLS messages other than a Client Hello if the message is not associated with an existing TLS session thread established via the inspection operation or a TLS encrypted data flow established via a bypass operation
- The TSF shall terminate a TLS session thread if it receives a fatal TLS error message from the monitored client
- The TSF shall attempt to terminate the TLS session thread and provide a TLS error message to the monitored client associated to the TLS session thread if it receives a fatal TLS error message on the TLS session to the requested server

- The TSF shall terminate a TLS session thread established via the inspect operation, and terminate a TLS encrypted data flow established by the bypass operation, if the TSF receives no traffic from the associated monitored client for a configurable period
- The TSF shall transition a TLS session thread state from inspect operation to block operation, when indicated to do so by the TLS plaintext processing policy.

**FDP\_TEP\_EXT.1.10** The TSF shall block all connections for which an Inspection or Bypass operation is not defined.

## 6.2.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

### 6.2.4.1 FIA\_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management

**FIA\_AFL.1.1** The TSF shall detect when an Administrator configurable positive integer within 1 – 10 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to Administrators attempting to authenticate remotely using a password.

**FIA\_AFL.1.2** When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing a remote session using any authentication method that involves a password until an Administrator defined time period has elapsed.

### 6.2.4.2 FIA\_ENR\_EXT.1 Certificate Enrollment

**FIA\_ENR\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall be able to generate a certificate request to an external certification authority to receive a certificate for the TOE's embedded CA's signing key using PKCS#10 in accordance with FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.

### 6.2.4.3 FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1 Password Management

**FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for administrative passwords:

- a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: “!”,”@”,”#”,”\$”,”%”,”^”,”&”,”\*”,”(”,”)””,”~”,”\_”,”+”,”=”,”[”,”]”,”{”,”}”,”.”,”””,”.”,””””,”,”,”,”,”/”,”<”,”>”,””,”|”,”|”;
- b) Minimum password length shall be configurable to between 15 and 255 characters.

### 6.2.4.4 FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication

**FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to initiate the identification and authentication process:

- Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA\_TAB.1;
- no other actions

**FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that administrative user.

### 6.2.4.5 FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism

**FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall provide a local password-based authentication mechanism to perform local administrative user authentication.

#### **6.2.4.6 FIA\_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback**

**FIA\_UAU.7.1** The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the administrative user while the authentication is in progress at the local console.

#### **6.2.4.7 FIA\_X509\_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation<sup>3</sup>**

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.1/Rev** The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certification path validation supporting a minimum path length of three certificates.
- The certification path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust anchor.
- The TSF shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the certification path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.
- The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using Certificate Revocation list (CRL) as specified in RFC 5759 Section 5.
- The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:
  - Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
  - Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
  - Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
  - OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.2/Rev** The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

#### **6.2.4.8 FIA\_X509\_EXT.1/STIP Certificate Validation (STIP)**

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.1/STIP** The TSF shall validate certificates used for connections supporting STIP functions in accordance with the following rules:

- RFC 5280 certificate validation and certification path validation supporting a minimum path length of three certificates.
- The certification path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust anchor.
- The TSF shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the certification path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.
- The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using the

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<sup>3</sup> This requirement is used for certificates associated with functions other than TLS connections between the TOE and monitored clients/requested servers.

Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) as specified in RFC 6960.

- The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules depending on the certificate type and purpose:
  - Server certificates presented in a TLS certificate message for Thru-Traffic processing TLS shall have meet one of the following checks:
    - There is no extendedKeyUsage field,
    - The extendedKeyUsage field is present and contains the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1),
    - The extendedKeyUsage field is present and contains the ‘any’ purpose (id-...)
  - Server certificates presented for TLS not associated with the Thru-Traffic processing include an extendedKeyUsage field that contains the ServerAuthentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1),
  - Code-signing certificates include the extendedKeyUsage field that contains the CodeSigning purpose
  - Client certificates presented for TLS for any purpose shall include the extendedKeyUsage field that contains the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
  - OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.
  - All other certificates used for any other purpose include an extendedKeyUsage field that DOES NOT contain the ‘any’ purpose.
- The TSF shall validate all extensions marked as critical and verify the value is appropriate for the functionality that uses the value.

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.2/STIP** The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

#### **6.2.4.9 FIA\_X509\_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication**

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for TLS, HTTPS, and no additional uses.

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.2** When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF shall allow the Security Administrator to choose whether to accept the certificate in these cases.

**Application Note:** This SFR is used to define this function in the context of the NDcPP functionality (e.g., non-STIP trusted channels).

#### **6.2.4.10 FIA\_X509\_EXT.2/STIP X.509 Certificate Authentication**

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.1/STIP** The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for TLS and no additional uses

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.2/STIP** When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the revocation status of a certificate, the TSF shall accept the certificate.

**Application Note:** This SFR is iterated from its definition in the NDcPP to define the implementation of this function specifically with respect to STIP functionality.

### 6.2.4.11 *FIA\_X509\_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Requests*

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.1** The TSF shall generate a Certificate Request Message as specified by RFC 2986 and be able to provide the following information in the request: public key and Common Name, Organization, Organizational Unit, Country.

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.2** The TSF shall validate the chain of certificates from the Root CA upon receiving the CA Certificate Response.

## 6.2.5 Security Management (FMT)

### 6.2.5.1 *FMT\_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of security functions behavior*

**FMT\_MOF.1.1/ManualUpdate** The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to perform manual updates to Security Administrators.

### 6.2.5.2 *FMT\_MOF.1/Services Management of security functions behavior*

**FMT\_MOF.1.1/Services** The TSF shall restrict the ability to start and stop services to Security Administrators.

### 6.2.5.3 *FMT\_MOF.1/STIP Management of security functions behavior*

**FMT\_MOF.1.1/STIP** The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the behaviour of the functions identified in the *Management Functions and Privileges table* to the roles defined in the *Management Functions and Privileges table*.

<i>Management Function</i>	<i>Security Administrator</i>	<i>Auditor</i>
<i>Ability to manage user accounts</i>	√	
<i>Ability to manage remote audit mechanism</i>	√	√
<i>Ability to perform on-demand integrity tests</i>	√	
<i>Ability to import and remove X.509v3 certificates used for STIP into or from the Trust Anchor Database</i>	√	
<i>Ability to configure identifying information for the TOE's embedded CA</i>	√	
<i>Ability to configure a maximum certificate validity duration</i>	√	
<i>Ability to manage inspection policy</i>	√	
<i>Ability to configure inspection processing details</i>	√	
<i>Ability to configure local audit behavior</i>	√	√
<i>Ability to configure and manage certificate profiles</i>	√	
<i>Ability to modify the OCSP configuration</i>	√	

**Table 6: Management Functions and Privileges**

### 6.2.5.4 *FMT\_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data*

**FMT\_MTD.1.1/CoreData** The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to Security Administrators.

### 6.2.5.5 *FMT\_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF Data*

**FMT\_MTD.1.1/CryptoKeys** The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the cryptographic keys to Security Administrators.

### 6.2.5.6 *FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions*

**FMT\_SMF.1.1** The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
- Ability to configure the access banner;
- Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
- Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using digital signature capability prior to installing those updates;
- Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA\_AFL.1;
- Ability to start and stop services;
- Ability to configure audit behavior;
- Ability to manage the cryptographic keys;
- Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;
- Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
- Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps.

### 6.2.5.7 *FMT\_SMF.1/STIP Specification of Management Functions (STIP)*

**FMT\_SMF.1.1/STIP** The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions in support of STIP operations:

- Ability to manage user accounts;
- Ability to manage remote audit mechanism;
- Ability to perform on-demand integrity tests;
- Ability to import and remove X.509v3 certificates used for STIP into or from the Trust Anchor Database;
- Ability to configure identifying information for the TOE's embedded CA;
- Ability to configure a maximum certificate validity duration;
- Ability to manage inspection policy;
- Ability to configure inspection processing *service connectors*;
- Ability to configure local audit behavior;
- Ability to configure and manage the certificate profiles;
- Ability to modify the OCSP configuration.

### 6.2.5.8 *FMT\_SMR.2 Restrictions on security roles*

**FMT\_SMR.2.1** The TSF shall maintain the roles:

- Security Administrator.

**FMT\_SMR.2.2** The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

**FMT\_SMR.2.3** The TSF shall ensure that the conditions

- The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;

- The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely
- are satisfied.

#### **6.2.5.9 FMT\_SMR.2/STIP Restrictions on security roles (STIP)**

**FMT\_SMR.2.1/STIP** The TSF shall maintain the roles:

- Security Administrator,
- Auditor.

**FMT\_SMR.2.2/STIP** The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

**FMT\_SMR.2.3/STIP** The TSF shall ensure that the conditions

- All roles shall be able to administer the TOE locally,
- All roles shall be able to administer the TOE remotely,
- No identity is authorized to assume both an Auditor role and any of the other roles in FMT\_SMR.2/STIP

are satisfied.

### **6.2.6 Protection of TSF (FPT)**

#### **6.2.6.1 FPT\_APW\_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords**

**FPT\_APW\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall store administrative passwords in non-plaintext form.

**FPT\_APW\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext administrative passwords.

#### **6.2.6.2 FPT\_FLS.1 Failure with Preservation of Secure State**

**FPT\_FLS.1.1** The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: DRBG failure, integrity test failure, external audit server is unavailable, no other potential TSF failures.

#### **6.2.6.3 FPT\_KST\_EXT.1 No Plaintext Key Export**

**FPT\_KST\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall prevent the plaintext export of *embedded CA's private key, private key of forged server certificate, TLS RSA private key, TLS ECDSA private key, TLS EC Diffie-Hellman private key, TLS pre-master secret and master secret, TLS session keys, SSH shared secrets (session keys), SSH EC Diffie-Hellman private key, SSH RSA private key, SSH ECDSA private key*.

#### **6.2.6.4 FPT\_KST\_EXT.2 TSF Key Protection**

**FPT\_KST\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall prevent the unauthorized use of all TSF private and secret keys.

#### **6.2.6.5 FPT\_RCV.1 Manual Trusted Recovery**

**FPT\_RCV.1.1** After *DRBG failure, integrity test failure* the TSF shall enter a maintenance mode where the ability to return to a secure state is provided.

#### **6.2.6.6 FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric, and private keys)**

**FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.

### **6.2.6.7 *FPT\_STM\_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps***

**FPT\_STM\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.

**FPT\_STM\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall allow the Security Administrator to set the time.

Application Note: [TD0632](#) applies to this SFR definition.

### **6.2.6.8 *FPT\_TST\_EXT.1/PowerOn TSF Testing (Extended)***

**FPT\_TST\_EXT.1.1/PowerOn** The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests during initial start-up (on power on), at the conditions *reboot* to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: *BIOS Power On at power on only for F5 Devices and vCMP, OpenSSL integrity at power on and reboot, software integrity at power on and reboot, cryptographic algorithm at power on and reboot.*

### **6.2.6.9 *FPT\_TST\_EXT.1/OnDemand TSF Testing (Extended)***

**FPT\_TST\_EXT.1.1/OnDemand** The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: *software integrity.*

### **6.2.6.10 *FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1 Trusted Update***

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to query the currently executing version of the TOE firmware/software and the most recently installed version of the TOE firmware/software.

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall provide Security Administrators the ability to manually initiate updates to TOE firmware/software and no other update mechanism.

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the TOE using a digital signature prior to installing those updates.

## **6.2.7 TOE Access (FTA)**

### **6.2.7.1 *FTA\_SSL\_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking***

**FTA\_SSL\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, terminate the session after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.

### **6.2.7.2 *FTA\_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination (Refinement)***

**FTA\_SSL.3.1** The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after a Security Administrator-configurable time interval of session inactivity.

### **6.2.7.3 *FTA\_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination (Refinement)***

**FTA\_SSL.4.1** The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator's own interactive session.

### **6.2.7.4 *FTA\_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners (Refinement)***

**FTA\_TAB.1.1** Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display a Security Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding use of the TOE.



## 6.2.8 Trusted path/channels (FTP)

### 6.2.8.1 FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel

**FTP\_ITC.1.1** The TSF shall be capable of using TLS and no other protocols to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server, TLS session proxying, no other capabilities that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.

**FTP\_ITC.1.2** The TSF shall permit the TSF, or the authorized IT entities to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

**FTP\_ITC.1.3** The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for establishment of TLS proxy connections, transmission of syslog records to syslog audit servers.

### 6.2.8.2 FTP\_TRP.1/Admin Trusted Path <sup>4</sup>

**FTP\_TRP.1.1/Admin** The TSF shall be capable of using SSH, TLS, HTTPS to provide a communication path between itself and authorized remote Administrators that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from disclosure and provides detection of modification of the channel data.

**FTP\_TRP.1.2/Admin** The TSF shall permit remote Administrators to initiate communication via the trusted path.

**FTP\_TRP.1.3/Admin** The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial Administrator authentication and all remote administration actions.

## 6.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

The security assurance requirements (SARs) provide grounds for confidence that the TOE meets its security objectives (for example, configuration management, testing, and vulnerability assessment). The table below identifies the security assurance requirements drawn from CC Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements that are required by the NDcPP.

Assurance Class	Assurance Component ID	Assurance Component Name
ADV: Development	ADV_FSP.1	Basic functional specification
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1	Operational user guidance
	AGD_PRE.1	Preparative procedures
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.1	Labeling of the TOE
	ALC_CMS.1	TOE CM coverage
ASE: Security Target	ASE_CCL.1	Conformance claims

<sup>4</sup> Note: The STIPM modified the definition of this requirement from the NDcPP.

Assurance Class	Assurance Component ID	Assurance Component Name
evaluation	ASE_ECD.1	Extended components definition
	ASE_INT.1	ST introduction
	ASE_OBJ.1	Security objectives for the operational environment
	ASE_REQ.1	Stated security requirements
	ASE_SPD.1	Security problem definition
	ASE_TSS.1	TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests	ATE_IND.1	Independent testing – sample
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.1	Vulnerability survey

**Table 7: Security Assurance Requirements**

In addition, the TOE will provide the evidence necessary for the evaluators to perform the evaluation activities defined in the Evaluation Activities for Network Device cPP document.

## 6.4 Security Requirements Rationale

This Security Target makes no modifications or additions to the NDcPP and STIPM security problem definition, security objectives, or security assurance requirements. The security functionality requirements claimed in this ST include all of the required SFRs from the NDcPP and STIPM, selected optional SFRs from the NDcPP and STIPM, and the mandatory selection-based SFRs from the NDcPP and STIPM. There are no additional SFRs or SARS included in this ST. Operations performed on the SFRs comply the corresponding Application Notes in the NDcPP and STIPM.

### 6.4.1 Security Functional Requirement Dependencies

All of the security functional requirements claimed in this Security Target are taken directly from the NDcPP version 2.2e or STIPM version 1.1, and all operations on the SFRs have been completed correctly. Therefore, the dependency rationale used by the NDcPP version 2.2e or STIPM version 1.1 is considered applicable and acceptable since the NDcPP and STIPM has been validated and approved.

## 7 TOE Summary Specification

This section presents a description of how the TOE SFRs are satisfied.

### 7.1 Security Audit

BIG-IP uses syslog functionality to generate audit records, including the start-up and shut-down of the audit functions themselves. BIG-IP is a standalone TOE storing audit data locally and transmitting audit data to external syslog hosts. BIG-IP implements one audit logging mechanism, namely syslog, for all auditable events.

#### 7.1.1 Audit Generation

BIG-IP systems generate different log types that capture different types of audit records. The audit records include:

- **audit events**  
events related to the security and administrative functionality implemented by the TOE; this type of audit log captures most of the events specified in this ST
- **system events**  
events related to the TOE operating system as well as status of TOE components, such as the syslog-ng daemon
- **packet filter events**  
events related to packet filtering applied by the TOE
- **local traffic events**  
events related to network traffic handled by the system, including some events related to packet filtering
- **certificate generation events**  
events related to the creation of forged (issued or generated) certificates, containing the forged certificate hash, DN, and server SID

The TOE provides the ability to configure syslog levels per daemon that generates the respective audit records. The Configuration utility GUI and tmsh provide interfaces to set those log levels.

Depending upon the exact audit record, the outcome is included in the description and / or the status code.

Table 8 shows the information included in the different types of audit logs.

<i>Log content</i>		<i>Log type</i>					
		System	Packet Filter	Local Traffic	Audit (mcp)	Audit (other)	Certificates
Timestamp	The time and date that the system logged the event message.	X	X	X	X	X	X
Log Level	Provides log level detail						X
Host name	The host name of the system that logged the event message.	X	X	X		X	X
Service	The service that generated the event.	X	X	X		X	X

<i>Log content</i>		<i>Log type</i>					
		<i>System</i>	<i>Packet Filter</i>	<i>Local Traffic</i>	<i>Audit (mcp)</i>	<i>Audit (other)</i>	<i>Certificates</i>
Status code	The status code associated with the event.		X		X		
Session ID	The ID associated with the user session.						X
Description	The description of the event that caused the system to log the message.	X	X	X	X	X	X
User Name	The name of the user who made the configuration change				X	X	
Transaction ID	The identification number of the configuration change initiated by another recorded event. This number can be used to trace back to the initiating audit entry and the associated user name.				X		
Event	A description of the configuration change that caused the system to log the message.				X		X

**Table 8: Audit Logs and Their Content**

The TOE includes within each audit record the information required by FAU\_GEN.1.2 and specified in Table 4 and required by FAU\_GEN.1.2/STIP and specified in Table 5.

### 7.1.2 Audit Storage

The certificate key file object name is logged to identify the relevant key in audit records recording the administrative task of generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys.

This functionality implements FAU\_GEN.1, FAU\_GEN.1/STIP and FAU\_GEN.2.

BIG-IP supports (and the evaluated configuration mandates) logging to external syslog hosts. Audit records in transit to the remote host are protected by TLS channels.

The syslog mechanism provided by the underlying Linux system (which is the operating system of the TOE) is used for the creation and forwarding of audit records. In the evaluated configuration, all audit records are sent to both local and remote storage automatically. The audit records are sent to the remote storage immediately. In addition, BIG-IP implements a high-speed logging mechanism for data traffic (logging packet filter events and local traffic events) in TMM that is compatible with syslog. The TOE supports TLS channels to audit servers for the protection of audit records sent from the TOE to an external audit server.

The TOE periodically checks the availability of the remote syslog host. If the remote syslog host becomes unavailable, audit records are stored locally in syslog files managed, and protected against unauthorized access, by using file permission bits in the underlying Linux host. The TOE will attempt to periodically reestablish the connection with the remote syslog host indefinitely. The TOE retries within seconds of each connection failure. The TOE implements a buffer to store audit records collected during the period of time when the remote syslog host is unavailable. If the connection to the remote syslog host is reestablished before the local audit buffers overflow, no audit records are lost. If the remote syslog host is unavailable and the local audit buffers are full, the BIG-IP system enters a degraded mode of operation, traffic processing is halted, and only auditable actions performed by the Security Administrator are allowed.

Locally stored audit records are also available for review through the administrative interfaces of the TOE. Only users in the Administrator role can modify those records. The TOE does not support deletion of audit records even by authorized users.

BIG-IP logs a warning if the local space for syslog files on the box exceeds a configurable maximum size. The TOE implements a local syslog file rotation scheme that numbers the locally archived syslog files. The TOE will delete the oldest syslog file once the maximum size for local syslog file space is exceeded. A cron job runs every two minutes to check the audit trail storage partition in order to accomplish this. The evaluated configuration requires allocation of 7 GB of audit storage, and a warning to be logged when 90 % of the storage space are exhausted. The administrator receives the warnings when reviewing the log files as instructed the CC guidance document.

This functionality implements FAU\_STG.1, FAU\_STG.4, FAU\_STG\_EXT.1, and FAU\_STG\_EXT.3/LocSpace.

### 7.1.3 Certificate Repository

The BIG-IP stores the forged (also known as issued or generated) certificates in the syslog audit trail which is stored on the external audit server. The syslog protocol is used by the TOE to store the forged certificates.

This functionality implements FAU\_GCR\_EXT.1.

## 7.2 Cryptographic Support

The TOE utilizes cryptographic algorithms that have been validated using the NIST CAVS tests.

Higher-level protocol stacks can use the F5 cryptographic module (OpenSSL) in order to implement trusted traffic communications:

- Management GUI (browser client to TOE)
- SSH session for tmsh (SSH client to SSH server on TOE)
- Remote logging via syslog (TOE to syslog server)
- TLS user traffic intended to pass through the TOE to servers

Replay detection (and rejection) is inherent to the protocols used by BIG-IP to establish communications of a trusted nature, i.e. TLS/HTTPS and SSH.

### 7.2.1 Key Generation and Establishment

The asymmetric keys are generated upon the request of an administrator by a Key Generator process that invokes the OpenSSL library on the Linux host.

The TOE generates asymmetric cryptographic keys that are compliant with FIPS PUB 186-4 and meet the following:

Key Generation Scheme	Key Establishment Scheme	Key sizes / NIST curves	Usage
RSA	RSA NIST SP 800-56B	Key sizes: 2048, 3072	<p>TLS certificate</p> <p>TLS ephemeral session keys</p> <p>SSH key pair</p> <p>The TLS static keys are created once, imported to the TOE, and stored on disk until the Administrator creates a new key. The SSH key pair is created on first boot.</p> <p>The TOE can act as a receiver or both sender and receiver depending upon the deployment.</p> <p>When acting as a receiver, decryption errors are handled in a side channel resistant method and reported as MAC errors.</p>
ECC	ECC NIST SP 800-56A	NIST curves: P-256, P-384	<p>For ECDHE and ECDSA in TLS.</p> <p>The TOE can act as a receiver or both sender and receiver depending upon the deployment.</p>

**Table 9: Key generation in the TOE**

The TOE also generates TLS session keys and SSH shared secrets (session keys) while setting up the communication session.

The TOE offers administrative interfaces for creating a private key and certificate signing request (CSR). See Section 7.4.2 for more information on CSRs.

This implements FCS\_CKM.1 and FCS\_CKM.2.

### 7.2.2 Zeroization of Critical Security Parameters

“Cryptographic Critical Security Parameters” are defined in FIPS 140-2 as “security-related information (e.g., secret and private cryptographic keys, and authentication data such as passwords and PINs) whose disclosure or modification can compromise the security of a cryptographic module.” Only the TLS and SSH session keys are stored in plaintext form. The persistent private and secret STIP keys are stored on disk encrypted with a passphrase that is stored in the F5 Secure Vault. The rest of the keys are stored in encrypted format. The encrypted keys are stored using the F5 Secure Vault. The F5 Secure Vault uses a Primary Key and a Unit Key to protect sensitive configuration attributes. The Primary Key is a single, symmetric key that is stored with the data and is used to protect the data. All sensitive configuration attributes, including passwords and passphrases, are encrypted with the Primary Key using 128-bit AES encryption. On F5 devices and vCMP, the Unit Key (a key-encrypting-key) is a symmetric key stored in the EEPROM that is associated with the device and is used to protect the Primary Key. The Primary Key is encrypted with the Unit Key using 256-bit AES encryption. If the Unit Key is replaced, the old Unit Key is cleared by overwriting it with random data and then the new Unit Key is written.

The following table discusses how the F5 cryptographic module (i.e. OpenSSL used by both data plane and control plane) zeroize critical security parameters that are not needed for operation of the TSF anymore. OPEN\_SSL\_cleanse() is used to zeroize data, and this routine has been updated to overwrite with zeros, not with pseudo-random data. This also includes key material used by the TSF that is stored

outside of the F5 cryptographic module. Keys in volatile and non-volatile storage are destroyed by performing a single overwrite consisting of zeroes.

Application	Key type	Storage Location	Volatile/ Non-volatile	Zeroized when?	Description
Key generation	seeds, prime numbers	Stack/heap	Volatile	After each key has been generated.	These are zeroized in OpenSSL by calling <code>OPENSSL_cleanse()</code> , which overwrites the memory upon release.
TLS SSLO	Premaster secret Master Secret Not persistent	Stack/heap	Volatile	After session has ended	Control Plane: The TLS secrets are created within OpenSSL during session initiation. These are zeroized in OpenSSL by calling <code>OPENSSL_cleanse()</code> , which overwrites the memory upon release.  Data Plane (TMM): TLS secrets are created as part of TMM's SSL handshake establishment. These are deleted when the handshake terminates. The memory is zeroized via a call to <code>crypto_buf_zeroize()</code> which cryptographically zeroizes the contents therein.
TLS SSLO	Session keys Not persistent	Stack/heap	Volatile	After session is no longer in use	Control Plane: The TLS session keys are created within OpenSSL during session initiation. These are zeroized in OpenSSL by calling <code>OPENSSL_cleanse()</code> , which overwrites the memory upon release.  Data Plane (TMM): TLS session keys are created as part of TMM's SSL handshake establishment. The session keys are deleted when the session is no longer in use. The memory is zeroized via a call to <code>memset()</code> .

Application	Key type	Storage Location	Volatile/ Non-volatile	Zeroized when?	Description
TLS SSLO	private keys in TLS certificates	On the disk	Non-volatile	Upon deletion by administrator.	Private keys are zeroized when they are deleted by the administrator. Zeroization is done by overwriting the file once with zeroes and deleting the file. The API used for zeroization is the write(2) system call which is called with buffer filled with zeros as input.
SSH	Shared Secrets (session keys) Not persistent	Stack/heap	Volatile	After session has ended	The SSH shared secrets (session keys) are created within OpenSSL during session initiation.  These are zeroized in OpenSSL by calling OPENSSL_cleanse(), which overwrites the memory upon release
SSH	SSH private keys	On the disk	Non-volatile	Upon deletion by administrator.	SSH keys are zeroized when using the key-swap utility. Zeroization is done by overwriting the file once with zeroes and deleting the file. The API used for zeroization is the shred(1) Linux command which uses the write(2) system call which is called with buffer filled with zeros as input.
SSLO	Embedded CA private key	On the disk or on the HSM	Non-volatile	Upon deletion or replacement by administrator.	Private keys are zeroized when they are deleted by the administrator. Zeroization is done by overwriting the file once with zeroes and deleting the file. The API used for zeroization is the write(2) system call which is called with buffer filled with zeros as input.



Application	Key type	Storage Location	Volatile/ Non-volatile	Zeroized when?	Description
SSLO	Private key of forged server certificate	Memory	Volatile	Upon re-issuance of the forged server certificate	The private key for forged server certificates are created when there is no previous valid forged certificate for that server.  These are zeroized in OpenSSL by calling OPENSSL_cleanse(), which overwrites the memory upon release

**Table 10: Zeroization of Critical Security Parameters**

This implements FCS\_CKM.4 and FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.

### 7.2.3 Cryptographic operations in the TOE

The following table summarizes the implementation of cryptographic operations in the TOE:

Algorithm	Key length (bits)	Purpose	Reference	SFR
AES (CBC, CTR, GCM modes)	128 256	payload encryption	AES as specified by ISO 18033-3  CBC as specified in ISO 10116  CTR as specified in ISO 10116  GCM as specified in ISO 19772	FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption
AES (CCM, CCM-8 modes)	128 256	Payload encryption for STIP support	AES as specified by ISO 18033-3  CCM and CCM-8 as specified by NIST SP 800-38C	FCS_COP.1/STIP
RSA	Modulus of 2048, 3072	certificate-based authentication, key exchange	FIPS PUB 186-4 Section 5.5 using RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5, ISO/IEC 9796-2	FCS_COP.1/SigGen
ECDSA	256, 384 bits  NIST curves: P-256, P-384, and no other	certificate-based authentication, key exchange	FIPS PUB 186-4 Section 6 and Appendix D  ISO/IEC 14888-3 Section 6.4	FCS_COP.1/SigGen

Algorithm	Key length (bits)	Purpose	Reference	SFR
SHA-1 SHA-256 SHA-384	none	certificate-based authentication / digital signature verification	ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004	FCS_COP.1/Hash
HMAC-SHA-1	Key sizes: $\geq 160$ bits Hash Function: SHA-1 Message digest sizes: 160 bits Block size: 512 bits Output MAC length: 160 bits	message integrity	ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
HMAC-SHA-256	Key sizes: $\geq 256$ bits Hash Function: SHA-256 Message digest sizes: 256 bits Block size: 512 bits Output MAC length: 256 bits	message integrity	ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
HMAC-SHA-384	Key sizes: $\geq 384$ bits Hash Function: SHA-384 Message digest sizes: 384 bits Block size: 1024 bits Output MAC length: 384 bits	message integrity software integrity	ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash
Random Bit Generation	none	key generation	ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using CTR DRBG (AES)	FCS_RBG_EXT.1

Table 11: Cryptographic primitives in the TOE

#### 7.2.4 Random Number Generation

The TOE transfers one or more random bit-streams from the defined entropy sources to the Linux

operating system's entropy pool. The entropy pool is used as a seed source for a digital random number generator (DRNG) via the /dev/random and /dev/urandom special file interfaces. The bit-stream will be transferred as necessary during system operation. On F5 devices and vCMP, the defined sources will be specific to the hardware available on each platform but will include one or more of the following: the jitterentropy-engine, Cavium Nitrox III hardware, Intel QAT hardware, and the Intel rdrand instruction.

The random bit stream from the entropy source will be fed to the Linux DRNG on demand, such that if the entropy in the Linux DRNG runs low (and thus the threshold that causes /dev/random to block will be reached soon), fresh entropy is inserted and the entropy estimate in the Linux RNG is increased. This will attempt to ensure that sufficient entropy is available in the Linux DRNG to avoid blocking applications that read from /dev/random, or will release any applications that have become blocked. Since the /dev/urandom interface also draws from the Linux kernel entropy pool input of the random bit stream will also ensure that /dev/urandom is initialized and reseeded. The increase in the entropy estimate caused by the transfer of the random bit stream is not equal to the number of bits transferred, rather it is scaled by a factor which is dependent on the entropy source.

This implements FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.

### 7.2.5 SSH

The TOE implements a SSH v2 server and a SSH v2 client. The SSH client is not used for communication with trusted external IT entities and will be disabled in the TOE. Administrators can connect to the TOE remotely using SSH via a dedicated network interface. Administrators are authenticated locally by user name and password; remote authentication (via LDAP or AD) is not supported by the TOE.

The SSH implementation is compliant with RFCs [4251](#), [4252](#), [4253](#), [4254](#), [5656](#), [6668](#), [8332](#).

SSH connections to the TOE's command line interface are protected using SSH version 2, using the cryptographic algorithms identified in Table 12.

Usage	Algorithm
Transport encryption algorithm	AES CBC and CTR mode with 128 and 256 bit-sizes keys
Transport data integrity protection hashing algorithm	HMAC-SHA1 and HMAC-SHA2-256
Public key authentication algorithms	ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
Key exchange (hard-coded)	ecdh-sha2-nistp256 and ecdh-sha2-nistp384

**Table 12: SSH Algorithms**

The SSH implementation monitors packet size on all channels and limits packet size as suggested in [RFC 4253](#) Section 6.1; the maximum packet size is (256\*1024) bytes with larger packets being silently dropped. Additionally, 70ertife-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange is intentionally disabled in the SSH implementation.

The SSH connection session key will be renegotiated after either of two thresholds has been reached. SSH connection session keys will be renegotiated after one hour of use. In addition, the SSH connection session key will be renegotiated after an administrator-configured maximum amount of data, the RekeyLimit, is transmitted over the connection. The administrative guidance will instruct the user to not set the RekeyLimit to a value greater than 1 GB.

This functionality implements FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.

## 7.2.6 TLS Protocol

The TOE implements both the TLS server and TLS client protocol.

Administrators remotely connect to the TOE via an HTTPS server implementing TLS over a dedicated network interface used to administer the TOE. Administrators are authenticated locally by user name and password; remote authentication (via LDAP or AD) is not supported by the TOE. Administrator sessions that use the web-based Configuration utility, SOAP protocol (iControl API), or the REST API (iControl REST API) are protected by TLS. TLS sessions are limited to TLS versions 1.2 and 1.1, using the cipher suites identified in Table 13. The TLS server implementation in the TOE is configured to deny SSL 1.0, SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, and TLS 1.0 session requests.

The TOE implementation of TLS client is capable of presenting a certificate to a TLS server for TLS mutual authentication. The TLS client implemented by the data plane of the TOE is used to communicate with the external audit server.

The following table summarizes the cipher suites supported by the evaluated configuration for TLS connections. All other proposed cipher suites are rejected.

Cipher	Data Plane Client	Data Plane Server	Control Plane Server
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	TLS v1.1 TLS v1.2	TLS v1.1 TLS v1.2	N/A
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	TLS v1.1 TLS v1.2	TLS v1.1 TLS v1.2	N/A
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	TLS v1.1 TLS v1.2	TLS v1.1 TLS v1.2	TLS v1.1 TLS v1.2
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	TLS v1.1 TLS v1.2	TLS v1.1 TLS v1.2	TLS v1.1 TLS v1.2
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	TLS v1.1 TLS v1.2	TLS v1.1 TLS v1.2	N/A
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	TLS v1.1 TLS v1.2	TLS v1.1 TLS v1.2	N/A
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	TLS v1.2	TLS v1.2	TLS v1.2
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256	TLS v1.2	TLS v1.2	TLS v1.2
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	TLS v1.2	TLS v1.2	N/A
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384	TLS v1.2	TLS v1.2	N/A
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	TLS v1.2	TLS v1.2	N/A
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	TLS v1.2	TLS v1.2	N/A
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	TLS v1.2	TLS v1.2	TLS v1.2
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	TLS v1.2	TLS v1.2	TLS v1.2

Cipher	Data Plane Client	Data Plane Server	Control Plane Server
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256	TLS v1.2	TLS v1.2	TLS v1.2
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384	TLS v1.2	TLS v1.2	TLS v1.2
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256	N/A	N/A	TLS v1.2
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384	N/A	N/A	TLS v1.2

**Table 13: Cipher suites**

When acting as a TLS server, BIG-IP does not operate on or process reference identifier fields in the BIG-IP certificate. It's up to an Administrator to load the desired X.509 certificate and up to TLS clients to verify it.

The TLS server supports session resumption based on session tickets according to RFC [5077](#). These session tickets adhere to the structural format described in Section 4 of RFC [5077](#). These session tickets are encrypted using the AES with CBC mode symmetric algorithm with 128 bit key length as defined in FCS\_COP.1/DataEncryption.

Session establishment creates a session ID. When a new context is started and a session ID is offered, the session ID is verified to be acceptable to allow session resumption by checking the validity of the session ID in the session ID table, the age of the session ID, the cipher suite offered in the session ID, configuration settings of the session ID, and the Server Name Indication (SNI). Any failure in these validation steps listed below would trigger a full handshake.

Multiple contexts are supported for session resumption. A session can be constructed in one context and resumed in another context. The context which constructs the session ID during full handshake is the owner of that session ID and also validates the session ID and session state. Contexts which resume a session request that the originating context session owner validate the session ID and session state. If the originating context session validation response does not validate the session, a full handshake is triggered. Contexts validate sessions by requesting that the originating owner of a session validate a session before resumption can continue. If a session is not validated, a full handshake is triggered.

When acting as a TLS server, BIG-IP generates key establishment parameters using RSA with key size 2048 and 3072 bits, and ECDH parameters over NIST curves secp256r1 and secp384r1. The TLS server key exchange message parameters (ECDH) are as defined / required by RFC [5246](#) Section 7.4.3 for TLS 1.2, RFC [4346](#) Section 7.4.3 for TLS 1.1, and RFC [4492](#). For example, its classic ECDH using named curves with predefined parameters. The TOE does not support DHE\_RSA cipher suites, so server key exchange messages are not sent.

For BIG-IP acting as TLS client, the TOE checks Common Name (CN) and DNS name. The CN or SAN in the certificate is compared by requiring an exact string match of the authenticate name against the IPv4 address in the certificate. The reference identifiers do not need to be converted by the TOE to perform this comparison.

The BIG-IP TLS client supports ECDH in the Client Hello by default. This can optionally be disabled by removing the corresponding cipher suites, although individual curves cannot be configured.

Use of wildcards for reference identifiers constructed by the TOE and certificate pinning for TLS client connections are not supported by the TOE.

This functionality implements FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.1[1] – [2], FCS\_TLSC\_EXT.2, FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1[1]-[4].

## 7.2.7 HTTPS Protocol

The BIG-IP provides three interfaces for remote administrators that communicate over HTTPS:

Configuration Utility, iControl API, and iControl REST API. HTTP over TLS (HTTPS) is an application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypermedia information systems transmitted over a TLS connection.

The TOE implements HTTPS per RFC [2818](#), HTTP over TLS. The HTTPS implementation is designed to comply with all mandatory portions of RFC 2818 (as denoted in the RFC by keywords “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, and “REQUIRED”). The optional portions of the RFC are denoted in the RFC by keywords “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, and “MAY”. Connection Initiation, Connection Closure, Client Behavior, Server Behavior, and Server Identity are implemented. For Connection Closure, the TOE includes a configuration setting in the SSL profile that controls alert protocols and the session close behavior. By default, the TOE is configured to close the underlying TCP connections without exchanging the required TLS shutdown close notify. The TOE can be configured to perform a clean shutdown of all TLS connections by sending a close notify.

This functionality implements FCS\_HTTPS\_EXT.1.

## 7.2.8 Thru-Traffic TLS Inspection

The BIG-IP SSL forward proxy functionality is implemented by creating Client SSL profiles and Server SSL profiles (also known as SSL forward proxy profiles) as specified in the guidance and configuring a virtual server with Client and Server SSL profiles for SSL forward proxy functionality. The TOE implementation of thru-traffic TLS inspection supports session renegotiation, but not mutual authentication. In the evaluated configuration, the profiles are configured with the allowed cipher suites and protocols.

The BIG-IP Client SSL profile enables the BIG-IP system to accept and terminate client requests that are sent using a fully SSL-encapsulated protocol. It also provides a number of configurable settings for managing client-side SSL connections. For the Client SSL profile, the BIG-IP server is the server side of the SSL connection.

The BIG-IP Server SSL profile enables the BIG-IP system to initiate secure connections to your SSL servers by using a fully SSL-encapsulated protocol and providing configurable settings for managing server-side SSL connections. For the Server SSL profile, the BIG-IP server is the client side of the SSL connection.

### 7.2.8.1 Thru-Traffic TLS Inspection Client Protocol

Thru-traffic TLS inspection client protocol refers to the SSL implementation when the BIG-IP is a client to a requested server. The BIG-IP Server SSL profile defines the parameters for this connection.

The BIG-IP thru-traffic TLS inspection implements TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1.0 as a client to the requested server and supports the ciphers listed in FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.1.1. The Ciphers setting in the Server SSL profile (that is attached to the SSLO virtual server) controls the cipher suites that are included in the Client Hello message sent to the requested server.

Server SSL certificate validation supports matching the server name identification, which is sent in the Client Hello message to the requested server, against the end entity certificate’s subject common name and certificate’s subject alternative names in the certificates extension received in the certificate message from the requested server. The TOE also supports wildcard matching on subject alternative names. The TOE does not support IP address matching.

The BIG-IP validates the certificate provide by the requested server. If the certificate is revoked or status is unknown and SSL forward proxy is enabled, the Server SSL performs the action configured in the Server SSL profile; the default value is set to ignore. The possible actions taken when the Server SSL cannot validate the certificate are:

- drop or abort the handshake,
- ignore allows the handshake to continue causing the client SSL to send a forged certificate with revoked status to the monitored client, or

- mask allows the handshake to continue causing the client SSL to send a valid forged server certificate to the monitored client.

In the evaluated configuration, the cipher suites presented in the Client Hello message are set to the ciphers listed in FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.1.1 in descending order with the most secure cipher suite listed first. The Security Administrator can change the order of the ciphers presented.

This functionality implements FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.1.

Either party in the TLS transaction is allowed to renegotiate the handshake using new cryptographic parameters. Session renegotiation can be enabled or disabled in BIG-IP using the Server SSL and Client SSL profiles. When session renegotiation is enabled, the BIG-IP processes mid-stream SSL renegotiation requests. When disabled, the system terminates the connection or ignores the request depending upon the settings in the SSL profile. By default, session renegotiation is enabled. The Server SSL profiles provide the following options to specify when renegotiation occurs:

- Renegotiation period, which controls the amount of time, in seconds, that the system waits before renegotiating the SSL session
- Renegotiation size, which controls the amount of data exchange, in megabytes, before the system renegotiates the SSL session
- Maximum record delay, which specifies the number of delayed records allowed during renegotiation
- Secure renegotiation which specifies the method of secure renegotiation. The values for this setting are:

- Request (requests secure renegotiation of SSL connections)
- Require (renegotiation requests to unpatched servers fail)
- Require Strict (renegotiation requests to unpatched servers fail)

Note: Within the context of the Server SSL profile, there is no behavioral difference between Require and Require Strict settings.

The default value for the Secure Renegotiation setting in the Server SSL profile is Require Strict.

This functionality implements FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.4.

Use of supported groups extension in the Client Hello message can be configured using the Cipher Group setting in the Server SSL and Client SSL profiles. The available supported groups are secp256r1, secp384r1, ffdhe2048(256), ffdhe3072(257), ffdhe4096(258).

This functionality implements FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.5

### 7.2.8.2 Thru-Traffic TLS Inspection Server Protocol

Thru-traffic TLS inspection server protocol refers to the SSL implementation when the BIG-IP is a server to the monitored client. The BIG-IP Client SSL profile defines the parameters for this connection.

The BIG-IP thru-traffic TLS inspection implements TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1.0 as a server to the monitored client and supports the ciphers listed in FCS\_TTTS\_EXT.1.1. BIG-IP denies connections from clients requesting SSL 2.0 and SSL 3.0.

BIG-IP implements the TLS protocols as specified in the corresponding RFCs: TLS 1.0 (RFC 2246), TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346), and TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246). Section 7 of these RFCs describe the handshake messages used by the protocols. The default option for the Client SSL and Server SSL profiles is to enable the “Generic Alert” option which sends a generic fatal alert 40 (handshake\_failure) in all error conditions. If the “Generic Alert” option is disabled, more specific alerts will be sent. The following table identifies the possible alerts with a brief description:

Alert	Description
-------	-------------

SSL_A_CLOSE_NOTIFY	Normal closes pending
SSL_A_UNEXPECTED_MSG	Unexpected handshake message type
SSL_A_BAD_RECORD_MAC	Record MAC verification error
SSL_A_DECRYPTION_FAILED	Decryption failure
SSL_A_RECORD_OVERFLOW	Record length too large
SSL_A_DECOMP_FAILURE	Decompression error
SSL_A_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE	No possible mutual configuration
SSL_A_NO_CERT_RESERVED	No certificate reserved
SSL_A_BAD_CERT	Bad certificate
SSL_A_UNSUPPORTED_CERT	Unsupported certificate signature
SSL_A_CERT_REVOKED	Certificate in our CRL
SSL_A_CERT_EXPIRED	Certificate no longer valid
SSL_A_CERT_UNKNOWN	Unidentifiable certificate
SSL_A_ILLEGAL_PARAM	Invalid field value
SSL_A_UNKNOWN_CA	Unknown certificate agent
SSL_A_ACCESS_DENIED	Authorization failure
SSL_A_DECODE_ERROR	Record parsing error
SSL_A_DECRYPT_ERROR	Generic cryptographic failure
SSL_A_EXPORT_RESTRICTION	Options violate export laws
SSL_A_PROTOCOL_VERSION	Peer's protocol version refused
SSL_A_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY	Client's offered ciphers too weak
SSL_A_INTERNAL_ERROR	Generic internal failure
SSL_A_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK	Warning: Handshake canceled unrelated to a protocol failure
SSL_A_USER_CANCELLED	Impatient user
SSL_A_NO_RENEGOTIATION	Renegotiation not allowed
SSL_A_MISSING_EXTENSION	Missing extension
SSL_A_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION	Unsupported extension
SSL_A_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE	Certificate Unobtainable
SSL_A_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME	Unrecognized name
SSL_A_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE	Bad certificate status response
SSL_A_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE	Bad certificate hash value
SSL_A_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL	No application protocol



**Table 14: TLS Server Error Alerts**

The Cipher Group setting in the Server SSL and Client SSL profiles can be configured to limit the key agreement parameters used in a server key exchange message with a monitored client. BIG-IP is capable of performing TLS key establishment with a monitored client using one of the following:

- RSA with key size 2048 bits, 3072 bits;
- Diffie-Hellman groups ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096
- EC Diffie-Hellman parameters using elliptic curves secp256r1, secp384r1 and no other curves.

This functionality implements FCS\_TTTS\_EXT.1.

Either party in the TLS handshake is allowed to renegotiate with new cryptographic parameters. Session renegotiation can be enabled or disabled in BIG-IP using the Server SSL and Client SSL profiles. When session renegotiation is enabled, the BIG-IP processes mid-stream SSL renegotiation requests. When disabled, the system terminates the connection or ignores the request depending upon the settings in the SSL profile. By default, session renegotiation is enabled. The Client SSL profiles provide the following options to specify when renegotiation occurs:

- Renegotiation period, which controls the amount of time, in seconds, that the system waits before renegotiating the SSL session
- Renegotiation size, which controls the amount of data exchange, in megabytes, before the system renegotiates the SSL session
- Maximum record delay, which specifies the number of delayed records allowed during renegotiation
- Secure renegotiation which specifies the method of secure renegotiation. The values for this setting are:
  - Request (requests secure renegotiation of SSL connections)
  - Require (initial SSL handshakes from clients are permitted, but renegotiation requests from clients that do not support secure renegotiation are terminated)
  - Require Strict (initial SSL handshakes from clients that do not support secure renegotiation are denied)

The default value for the Secure Renegotiation setting is Require in the Client SSL profile.

This functionality implements FCS\_TTTS\_EXT.4.

## 7.3 User Data Protection

### 7.3.1 Forged Certificate Issuance

The BIG-IP SSL forward proxy mechanism can encrypt all traffic between a monitored client and BIG-IP using a certificate and encrypt all traffic between the BIG-IP and the server using a different certificate. The BIG-IP SSL forward proxy functionality is implemented by creating Client SSL and Server SSL forward proxy profiles and configuring a virtual server with Client and Server SSL profiles for SSL forward proxy functionality. The Server SSL profiles are compliant with the certificate issuance requirements defined in FDP\_CER\_EXT.1.

A monitored client establishes a three-way handshake and SSL connection with the wildcard IP address of the BIG-IP virtual server. The BIG-IP then establishes a three-way handshake and SSL connection with the server and receives and validates the server certificate (while maintaining a separate SSL connection with the monitored client). The BIG-IP uses the server certificate to create a forged server certificate that is consistent with the configured SSL profiles to send to the client. The monitored client receives the forged server certificate from the BIG-IP and recognizes the forged certificate as originating directly from the server.

This functionality implements FDP\_CER\_EXT.1.

The BIG-IP audit trails records when the following events occur:

- Creation of the forged SSL certificate which includes the session ID and a hash of the original server certificate
- SSL handshake for the forged server which includes the session ID and a hash of the forged server certificate

An administrator can search the audit trail for the SSL certificate forgery event, identify the session ID, and then search using that session ID for the corresponding SSL handshake. Finding the two audit records described above identifies the corresponding server certificates providing linkage between the original server certificate and the forged server certificate for that session ID.

This functionality implements FDP\_CER\_EXT.2.

The BIG-IP embedded CA within the SSL forward proxy only accepts certificate signing requests (CSRs) generated internally by BIG-IP; externally generated CSRs are not accepted. All CSRs are generated internally within the SSL stack and submitted to the embedded CA within the SSL forward proxy.

This functionality implements FDP\_CER\_EXT.3.

When BIG-IP is configured according to the CC guidance, forged certificates will have a certificate validity of less than 24 hours. The TOE does not generate certificate status information.

This functionality implements FDP\_CSIR\_EXT.1.

### 7.3.2 Residual Information Protection

Data buffers used to implement STIP functions, including decrypted TLS payloads, are freed as soon as cryptographic processing is completed. The buffers are freed by the cryptographic module, OpenSSL, and mcpd. Buffers are overwritten with zeros when freed.

This functionality implements FDP\_RIP.1

### 7.3.3 Certificate Data Storage

The BIG-IP includes the following trusted public keys and certificates: embedded CA, forged server, TLS RSA, TLS ECDSA, TLS EC Diffie-Hellman, SSH EC Diffie-Hellman, SSH RSA, SSH ECDSA.

CA certificates are stored in files in BIG-IP. This file can be updated automatically through a BIG-IP upgrade or manually. The TOE will not provide the ability to directly access the certificate and key files. These files can only be modified through the command line interface ("tmsh") or the web-based GUI. The storage containing the certificates file is protected by the TOE not providing an interface to access the filesystem directly.

This functionality implements FDP\_STG\_EXT.1

### 7.3.4 TLS Establishment Policy

The BIG-IP initialization (start-up) process encompasses the following:

1. Power on system and the CPU begins executing firmware
2. Bootloader executes
3. System initialization scripts are executed which initialize hardware, auditing, entropy, and F5 specific initialization scripts.
4. Standard OS features are initialized, including httpd
5. OpenSSL is initialized
  - a. BIG-IP DB variables CommonCriteria and SecurityFIPSCfg are checked. If enabled, OpenSSL is initialized in FIPS mode.
  - b. If in FIPS-mode, entropy is initialized and self-tests are executed
  - c. Ciphers and hash algorithms are loaded
  - d. Error strings are loaded
  - e. Set the TLS protocol version and create the SSL context structure

6. BIG-IP daemons are launched
  - a. TMM is launched and reads the DB variable `commoncriteria.stip`. If it's enabled, TMM will enforce STIP requirements (e.g. specific certificate forging behavior in SSL forward proxy, use specific ciphers per STIP spec, etc...)
  - b. Prior to TMM entering ready state, TLS messages are dropped by BIG-IP.
  - c. Once TMM enters ready state, it begins processing data plane traffic and TLS session processing

By default, the TOE is deployed in intercept mode. The TLS stack within TMM, openssl, and the cryptographic module are involved in processing TLS messages. If any of these components fail, the failure is fatal and the TLS handshake and connection are terminated. By default, the SSL forward proxy is designed to not trigger TLS handshake bypass in the case of a component failure. The Server-SSL profile can be configured to trigger a dynamic bypass in the event that one of the following scenarios occur:

- If backend server requests a client certificate in TLS handshake and Server SSL is not configured with one, the administrator can turn on "Bypass on Client Certificate Failure" in SSL configurations Server SSL profile advanced settings section. This will trigger a dynamic bypass in case SSL Forward Proxy needs to send original client certificate to the backend server.
- If Server SSL handshake fails with a Handshake Alert, there is an option to trigger dynamic bypass "Bypass on Handshake Alert" in SSL configurations Server SSL profile advanced settings section. This will trigger a dynamic bypass if Server SSL TLS handshake fails with Alert #40.

In both Dynamic Bypass cases, a WARNING log message will be logged for auditing purposes in `/var/log/ltm`. Other than above mentioned two dynamic bypass settings, a Bypass operation on TLS handshake can only be triggered when configured in SSL profile directly or via Policy rules.

BIG-IP recognizes the TLS protocol at both the client and server side by parsing the bytes of incoming TLS message to identify the record layer version and handshake protocol version of the TLS handshake Client hello message. The Client SSL and Server SSL profile options-list can be configured to disable some TLS protocol versions for connecting to SSLO.

There are no non-configurable rules for implementing TLS session establishment policies. The virtual server configured by the administrator defines a specific IP version on which that virtual server intercepts traffic. SSLO listens on either an IPv4 or IPv6 virtual server and is able to read all corresponding IPv4 or IPv6 traffic. An SSLO policy is used to implement TLS session establishment policy rules based on the network protocol. Rules based on other subject attributes of the monitored client and server are configurable via iRules. There is a default rule (block, allow, send to chain) that is configurable. All session establishment policies are configurable.

The SSLO Security Policy rules can match on the following:

- client IP
- client port
- server IP
- server port
- server name in TLS Client Hello
- client VLANS
- server certificate (issuer DN, subject DN, or SANs)

For each match, the administrator specifies a policy action (allow, reject, block/abort), an SSL proxy action (bypass, intercept), and a configured service chain (which can be none). The administrator can enable logging block/abort and bypass operations by setting the log level for Per-Request Policy in the Log Settings menu to Information. This log setting applies to all security policy rules.

The administrator can configure the Client SSL and Server SSL profiles options list to define rules for TLS versions used for TLS handshakes. Rules for cipher suites and DH groups can be defined using cipher rules and groups to attach to the profile.

Revocation status may be unavailable for a variety of reasons. If server returns an UNKNOWN OCSP response, the administrator can configure whether SSLO forges the UNKNOWN response to client for inspection and decision by client or drop the connection by setting the unknown-cert-status-response-control option in Server-SSL profile to ignore or drop respectively. If revocation status is not available due to OCSP responder being offline, SSL Forward Proxy will forge a response status `SSL_OCSP_RESP_STATUS_TRYLATER` with cert status `SSL_OCSP_CERT_STATUS_NONE`. The decision will be left to monitored client on whether to continue with the connection. In other words, unknown-cert-status-response-control controls specific unknown OCSP response.

Mutual authentication for thru-traffic processing is not supported by the TOE.

TLS protocol errors are handled as described below.

TLS Protocol Error	Mechanism
Block the connection if the monitored client does not support a TLS version, cipher suite, key exchange, and key size that are in its allowed set (including the supported groups <code>secp256r1</code> , <code>secp384r1</code> , <code>ffdhe2048(256)</code> , <code>ffdhe3072(257)</code> , <code>ffdhe4096(258)</code> )	Controlling the cipher-string/cipher group on the Client-SSL profile of SSL forward proxy can result in blocking this connection. When the device is in CC/STIP mode, there is a separate CC/STIP cipher string (and also a cipher group) that sets the cipher list to this string. By default, the cipher suites are presented in the Client Hello message in the descending order of security (i.e. most secure cipher suite first). If the ciphers advertised by monitored client in the ClientHello does not match the ones set in Client-SSL profile, the TLS session will not be established with appropriate error code sent to client. Administrators can also configure options like “No TLSv1.1” etc in options-list of the Client-SSL profile to limit the TLS protocols allowed for the client.
Block the connection if the requested server does not negotiate a TLS version, cipher suite, key exchange, and key size that are in its allowed set (including the supported groups <code>secp256r1</code> , <code>secp384r1</code> , <code>ffdhe2048(256)</code> , <code>ffdhe3072(257)</code> , <code>ffdhe4096(258)</code> )	Similar to the approach above, but control the cipher-string/cipher-group or options-list of the Server-SSL profile attached to SSL Forward Proxy.
Block the connection if the requested server does not negotiate a TLS version, cipher suite, key exchange, and key size that are in the set proposed by the monitored client in its Client Hello message	SSL Forward Proxy server-side connection is independent from client-side in terms of cipher suite selection. So to use cipher from monitored client’s ClientHello, the cipher-string or cipher-group should allow very few ciphers to make this happen. This can be controlled by modifying cipher-string/cipher-group and options-list of the Client-SSL and Server-SSL profiles.

Block or inspect the connection if TOE certificate processing indicates revocation information is not available for a requested server	If a server returns an UNKNOWN OCSP response, administrators can control whether SSL Forward proxy forges the UNKNOWN response to client for inspection and decision by client or whether the connection is dropped by setting the unknown-cert-status-response-control option in Server-SSL profile to ignore or drop respectively.
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The TOE implements the following default SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy rules on all SSL/TLS network traffic received from interfaces associated with monitored clients and requested servers:

- drop and be capable of logging invalid TLS messages
- drop and be capable of logging TLS Client Hello messages for which no valid client can be determined
- drop a TLS Client Hello message for which no valid server attribute can be determined
- drop and be capable of logging TLS messages other than a Client Hello if the message is not associated with an existing TLS session thread established via the inspection operation or a TLS encrypted data flow established via a bypass operation
- terminate a TLS session thread if it receives a fatal TLS error message from the monitored client
- attempt to terminate the TLS session thread and provide a TLS error message to the monitored client associated to the TLS session thread if it receives a fatal TLS error message on the TLS session to the requested server
- terminate a TLS session thread established via the inspect operation, and terminate a TLS encrypted data flow established by the bypass operation, if the TSF receives no traffic from the associated monitored client for a configurable period
- transition a TLS session thread state from inspect operation to block operation, when indicated to do so by the TLS plaintext processing policy.

All connections for which an Inspection or Bypass operation is not defined are blocked.

This functionality implements FDP\_TEP\_EXT.1.

### 7.3.5 Plaintext Processing and Routing

The Security Policy includes a set of rules that determines which TLS flows are decrypted and sent to inspection service processing using either TCP/IP or UDP/IP. The inspection processing functional components are external systems. The configured rules consist of conditions which match a flow against a configured set of parameters based on any of the following: destination address, destination port, TLS server certificate message attributes, SNI, DN, and distinct interfaces. When a match occurs, the rules define the action to be taken: Allow, Abort (Block), Reject, Intercept (decrypt) Bypass (do not decrypt), and send to service chain combination. The service chain combination determines if plaintext traffic is sent to services in the service chain. If the flow matches a Security Policy Rule with a Service Chain action, the decrypted plaintext is sent to external inspection services using a service chaining mechanism as defined in the Security Policy. A service chain includes an ordered group of services capable of processing plaintext messages.

If the data forwarded to the inspection processing functional component is not malicious, the data is returned to the TOE for processing. If the data is determined to be malicious or malformed, the data is dropped or the connection is rejected.

This functionality implements FDP\_PPP\_EXT.1, FDP\_PRC\_EXT.1

### 7.3.6 SSL/TLS Inspection Proxy Functions

BIG-IP SSLO implements TLS 1.2, TLS 1.0, and TLS 1.1 with session renegotiation as a client to the requested server that supports the cipher suites defined in FCS\_TTTC\_EXT.1. BIG-IP SSLO also

implements TLS 1.2, TLS 1.0, and TLS 1.1 with session renegotiation as a server to the monitored client that supports the cipher suites defined in FCS\_TTTS\_EXT.1. TLS traffic transmitting between these two TLS sessions is decrypted by the BIG-IP SSLO, assigned a unique TLS session ID and routed to a chain of inspection services, which can be internal or external to the TOE, as configured in the security policy.

This functionality implements FDP\_STIP\_EXT.1.1.

To implement the SSLO forward proxy capability, the TOE uses the server name value (SNI) from the TLS ClientHello message sent by the monitored client as a lookup key to search the internal certificate cache within TMM for a previously forged server certificate issued by the embedded CA. If the TOE does not locate a previously forged server certificate, the original server's certificate is used as a template to create a forged server's certificate. This newly forged server's certificate is saved in the internal cache using the SNI as a key. If the monitored client does not send an SNI in the TLS ClientHello, the IP address is used as a lookup key.

This functionality implements FDP\_STIP\_EXT.1.2.

The ccmode script executed during system installation, instructs the administrator to revoke inspection consent by setting the 'inspectionconsent' DB variable to 'no' if the administrator does not consent to having the system intercept and inspect TLS traffic. The administrator must confirm to continue with intercepting SSL/TLS encrypted traffic.

This functionality implements FDP\_STIP\_EXT.1.3.

By default, SSL forward proxy intercepts all encrypted traffic except when policy (e.g. Security Policy or iRule) sets a bypass action dynamically based on matching rules set by administrator. Bypassing the inspection operation is achieved by setting the SSL layer to pass-through mode. If server-side connection exists, it will be torn down and a new server-side connection will be established. Then, the Client Hello message sent by the client will be forwarded to the server.

This functionality implements FDP\_STIP\_EXT.1.4.

The TOE generates different error messages when initiating a Block operation depending on what conditions in the policy initiates the Block. If the block operation is triggered at the TCP or HTTP protocol layer, a TCP RST packet is sent to the monitored client. If the block operation is triggered based on client or server TLS property, a TLS Alert message at the fatal level will be sent to the monitored client, followed by a TCP RST packet. The alert code in the Alert message is Handshake Failure (40 if Generic Alert is enabled in the client SSL profile; otherwise the alert code is Access Denied (49).

This functionality implements FDP\_STIP\_EXT.1.5.

## 7.4 Identification and Authentication

Administrative users (i.e., all users authorized to access the TOE's administrative interfaces) are identified by a user name and authenticated by an individual password associated with that user account. This is true regardless of how the administrative user interfaces with the TOE. If the supplied user name and password match the user name and password pair maintained by the TOE, the administrative session is successfully established. Otherwise, the user receives an error and the session is not established. In addition, the TOE displays warning banners for interactive sessions as described in Section 7.6.5.

This functionality implements FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1, FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2.

For interactive user authentication at the web-based Configuration utility via HTTPS and the command line tmsh via SSH, BIG-IP obscures passwords entered by users.

This functionality implements FIA\_UAU.7.

### 7.4.1 Password policy and user logout

The TOE can enforce a password policy for all user accounts managed locally, other than those in the Administrator role. This includes the definition of a minimum password length and required character types (numeric, uppercase, lowercase, others). The minimum password length default value is 15; the valid range is from 15 to 255. This policy is enforced when users change their own passwords.

The TSF allows passwords to contain the following special characters: “!” “@” “#” “\$” “%” “^” “&” “\*” “(” “)” “~” “-” “+” “=” “[” “]” “{” “}” “.” “,” “:” “;” “/” “<” “>” “” “|” “\”.

Other aspects of the authentication policy include the minimum and maximum lengths of time that passwords can be in effect, and the number of previous passwords that BIG-IP should store to prevent users from re-using former passwords.

- The minimum duration specifies the minimum number of days before which users cannot change their passwords; the default is 0 and the valid range is from 0 to 255.
- The maximum duration specifies the maximum number of days a password is valid; users must change their passwords before the maximum duration is reached, the default is 99999 days.
  - User accounts whose password has expired, based on the administrator-defined maximum password duration, are locked and require an administrator to reset them.
- Password memory specifies that the system records the specified number of passwords that the user has used in the past. Users cannot reuse a password that is in the list. The default is 0 and the valid range is from 0 to 127.

Both local and remote access to the TOE for individual users can be disabled (“locke”) after a configured number of consecutive, failed authentication attempts on that user account. In the evaluated configuration, the default is 3 consecutive, failed authentication attempts with a valid range from 1 to 10. For each administrative interface (local and remote interfaces), a single centralized module in the TOE verifies user identification and authentication. That module returns authentication success or failure decisions and maintains the user lockout feature. A counter of failed authentication attempts is maintained for each user. If too many failed authentication attempts occur, the associated user account is locked out and access is denied. A counter is kept for each user to track consecutive authentication failures. When a successful authentication occurs, the counter is reset to zero.

In the evaluated configuration, an administrator-configured time value determines the duration of a user’s lock out time. The default is 10 minutes (600 seconds).

In the evaluated configuration, it is not possible for all administrative users to be locked out of the TOE, because the primary administrative user account is permitted to login to the local console even if it is locked out when attempting to login through any remote interface.

This functionality implements FIA\_AFL.1, FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1.

### 7.4.2 Certificate Enrollment

During initial system setup, the administrator must either import or generate an asymmetric key pair and CA certificate signed by a trusted external CA to the embedded CA. The administrator has two options:

- 1) generate a key pair and CA certificate on an external system, then import the key pair and certificate onto BIG-IP
- 2) generate a key pair on the BIG-IP, generate a CSR on the BIG-IP, send the CSR to an external CA to create a signed CA certificate, then import that CA certificate on to the BIG-IP

The private key for the embedded CA is stored on the file system encrypted with a passphrase stored in the F5 Secure Vault or if the key pair is generated by an HSM, it is stored on the HSM. The guidance instructs the installer to configure the system to include a key pair and CA certificate for the embedded

CA using one of these methods. This process can be repeated by an authorized administrator at any time the system is running to update or change the CA certificate for the embedded CA.

This functionality implements FIA\_ENR\_EXT.1.

### 7.4.3 TLS Certificate Validation

For TLS client sessions on the data plane, the TOE implements certificate validation using the OpenSSL crypto library. The TLS client in the data plane supports TLS with mutual authentication for trusted communication channels with the external audit server.

The TOE supports validation of X.509 digital certificates using a certificate revocation list (CRL) as specified in [\[RFC 5280\]](#) Section 5. Administrators create profiles which are used to define the parameters used to communicate with an external entity. These parameters include the ability to require the use of TLS and peer or mutual authentication and a definition of the certificate to use for authentication. This capability is used to create a mutually authenticated connection with the external audit server. The external audit server provides a certificate to the TOE during establishment of the TLS connection in order to authenticate the external audit server.

The TOE offers administrative interfaces for creating a private key and certificate signing request (CSR). The CSR may include the following information: public key, common name, organization, organizational unit, country, locality, state / province, country, e-mail address, subject alternative name. After the CSR is created, the administrator must export the CSR outside the TOE. Outside the scope of the TOE, the administrator provides the CSR to the CA and then the CA returns the certificate to the administrator. Using the administrative interface, the administrator can then import the certificate into the TOE.

The only method supported by the TOE for obtaining a CA certificate is for the administrator to save a Certificate to a text file and import it into the TOE. The certificates are stored in a text file. The TOE is capable of importing X.509v3 certificates and certificates in the PKCS12 format. The TOE is also capable of creating and using a self-signed certificate.

The TOE checks the validity of the certificates when the profile using the certificate is loaded and when the certificate is used by the TOE, including during authentication. If the certificates are modified, the digital signature verification would detect that the certificate had been tampered with and the certificate would be invalid. Administrators can ensure that the certificates presented have not been revoked by importing a certificate revocation list (CRL) into the TOE.

A certificate chain includes the root CA certificate, certificates of intermediate cAs, and the end entity certificate. The certificate chain consists of all the certificates necessary to validate the end certificate. Administrators can upload trusted device certificates (root CA certificates) into the TOE to identify which certificates are trusted. The TOE performs full certificate chain checking using Public Key Infrastructure X.509, verifies the expiration of the certificate (assuming a reliable time), and verifies its revocation using CRLs.

When the validity of a certificate cannot be established, the TOE will allow the administrator to choose whether or not to accept the certificate.

This implements FIA\_X509\_EXT.1/Rev, FIA\_X509\_EXT.2, FIA\_X509\_EXT.2/STIP, FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.

### 7.4.4 Thru-Traffic Processing Certificate Validation

Received certificates are verified in TMM immediately upon receipt by BIG-IP during the TLS handshake. The certificate verification includes building a trust chain, validating the certificate not-before and not-after dates, and then verifying that the signature on each certificate in the chain is performed by its issuer. The TLS certificate validity is checked first and thereafter, the OCSP certificate validity check occurs.

Certificate authentication used by thru-traffic processing functions the same as it does for standard TLS traffic.



This implements FIA\_X509\_EXT.1/STIP.

## 7.5 Security Function Management

The TOE provides the ability to administer the TOE both locally and remotely. Local administration is performed via the serial port console. Remote access to the management interfaces is only made available on the dedicated management network port of a BIG-IP system.

The TOE offers administrators four different methods to configure and manage the TSF. They are:

- Configuration Utility (Web-based GUI) — browser-based GUI interface with normal GUI panels and selections. The client browser talks to the Apache HTTP server over HTTPS; then the request passes through tomcat and to the BIG-IP.
- tmsh shell commands – provide a command line interface, accessible through an SSH client
- iControl API – SOAP-based programming interface over HTTPS.
- iControl REST API – REST-based programming interface over HTTPS.

These management interfaces are implemented in the background by a central management control program daemon (mcpd) that provides configuration information to individual TOE parts and coordinates its persistent storage.

The first three interfaces are independent. The tmsh interface is the most complete; though none of the three are proper subsets of each other. iControl REST APIs utilize tmsh shell command(s) to perform the desired operation, so it is basically a front-end to the tmsh shell commands. As such, the functions provided by the iControl REST API are a proper subset of the set of tmsh commands.

Management Function	tmsh	Configuration Utility (Web-based GUI)	iControl App	iControl REST API
Ability to manage user accounts	X	X	X	X
Ability to manage remote audit mechanism	X	X	X	X
Ability to perform on-demand integrity tests	X			
Ability to import and remove X.509v3 certificates used for STIP into or from the Trust Anchor Database	X	X	X	X
Ability to configure identifying information for the TOE's embedded CA	X	X	X	X
Ability to configure a maximum certificate validity duration	X	X	X	X
Ability to manage inspection policy		X		
Ability to configure inspection processing service connectors		X		
Ability to configure local audit behavior	X	X	X	X
Ability to configure and manage the certificate profiles	X	X	X	X
Ability to modify the OCSP configuration	X	X	X	X

**Table 15: BIG-IP Management Functions per interface**

Remote use of these interfaces is performed over protected communication paths as described in Section 7.8. These four administrative interfaces require users to identify and authenticate themselves prior to performing any administrative functions.

The TOE comes with a pre-defined “admin” user with the Administrator role assigned that cannot be deleted. A password is assigned to the “admin” user during setup of the TOE. Local user accounts are managed by administrators in the Administrator or User Manager role and stored in the TOE’s local user database. Management includes creating and deleting users, as well as changing another user’s password (every user can change their own password), role, or partition the user has access to, and enabling or disabling terminal access for the user. However, User Managers that have access to only one partition cannot change the partition access of other users, and cannot change their own partition access or role. (More information on roles can be found in Section 7.5.1.)

Some general configuration options include:

- definition of an administrative IP address for the TOE’s management network interface
- configuration of remote logging
- configuration of auditing
- configuration of TOE security functions
- start/stop services
- manage TSF data, configure the login access banner
- configure session inactivity timeout
- manage cryptographic keys
- configure cryptographic functionality
- configure the RekeyLimit which defines how much data can be transmitted within an SSH connection before rekeying
- configuration of trusted updates
- set the time period for rejecting logins from an Administrator who has reached the maximum number of unsuccessful authentication attempts, and
- set the time which is used for time stamps.

BIG-IP uses the concept of virtual servers to define destinations that BIG-IP accepts (client) traffic for. Virtual servers are represented by an IP address and service (such as HTTP). The actual resources that BIG-IP forwards the traffic to are referred to as nodes, represented by their IP address. Nodes can be grouped into pools, for example for the purpose of load balancing. (A client sends an HTTP request to BIG-IP’s virtual server address, and BIG-IP will then select a node from the pool associated with the virtual server to forward the request to.) Virtual servers are a management tool used to simplify the configuration of filtering and processing incoming network requests.

In order to determine the treatment of different types of traffic, such as requiring client authentication or inspection of HTTP code at the application layer, administrators can assign profiles to virtual servers. Profiles contain detailed instructions on how the different traffic management-related security functions of the TOE are applied to matching traffic.

The Security Administrator is able to start and stop the following services using the “bigstart <stop, start, restart> <service>” command or the following tmsh command “tmsh <stop, start, restart> /sys service <service>”. The list of services that can be started and stopped are found in <https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K67197865>.

The BIG-IP restricts the ability to modify the behavior of the management functions listed in Table 6 to the Security Administrator and/or Auditor as identified in that table.

This functionality implements FMT\_MOF.1/Services, FMT\_MOF.1/STIP, FMT\_SMF.1, FMT\_SMF.1/STIP.

### 7.5.1 Security Roles

Access of individual users to the web-based Configuration utility, tmsh, iControl API, and iControl REST API is restricted based on pre-defined roles. Role enforcement is the same for each of these management interfaces. These roles define which type of objects a user has access to and which type of tasks he or she can perform. The role definitions cannot be changed by TOE administrators. Table 16 contains the definition of user roles.

The TOE allows security administrators to define the type of terminal access that individual users have, i.e. whether they have access to the tmsh via SSH or not. The TOE can be administered either locally or remotely. Administering the TOE locally entails connecting a device to the management port on the BIG-IP via an Ethernet cable

The tasks that users can perform on objects, depending on their role, are grouped into hierarchical access levels:

- write: create, modify, enable and disable, and delete an object
- update: modify, enable, and disable an object
- enable/disable: enable and disable an object
- read: view an object

In addition to roles, the TOE implements the concept of partitions for restricting access to objects. Configuration objects that deal with the individual traffic management functions offered by the TOE are stored in partitions (either the Common partition, or administrator-defined partitions. Objects (including users, server pools, etc.) can be created in different partitions by administrators, and users can be assigned a partition they have access to ("partition access"). As a result, users will only have the type of access defined by their assigned role to objects in the partition that is defined by their partition access. (With certain exceptions documented in the tables below.) It is possible to assign a user access to "all" partitions, in which case the user will have access to objects in all partitions as defined by their role (referred to in the guidance documentation as "universal access").

**Note:** The fact that a user account is created in a specific partition does not mean that the user will automatically have access to other objects in that partition.

The TOE comes with a pre-defined "Common" partition, which cannot be deleted. New objects created by users are either placed in the user's partition, or - if the user has access to all partitions - are placed in the Common partition unless the user explicitly chooses otherwise. The pre-defined "admin" user with the Administrator role is located in the Common partition.

Even users who are located in a partition other than Common have certain access to objects in the Common partition, as follows:

- Administrator always has access to all objects defined in the TOE.
- User Managers have write access to user account objects in the Common partition, except those with the Administrator role assigned to them.
- Resource Administrators, Managers, Certificate Managers, Application Editors, Operators, and Guests have read access to all objects in the Common partition.

Role	Associated rights
Administrator	This role grants users complete access to all partitioned and non-partitioned objects on the system, manage remote user accounts and change their own passwords. This includes trusted updates and the management of all security functions and TSF data.
Resource Administrator	This role grants users complete access to all partitioned and non-partitioned objects on the system, except user account objects. Additionally, users with this role can change their own passwords. This includes management of all security functions and TSF data, including remote users, remote roles, but not other user management functions.
User Manager	Users with the User Manager role that have access to all partitions can create, modify, delete, and view all user accounts except those that are assigned the Administrator role, or the User Manager role with different partition access. However, User Managers cannot manage user roles for remote user accounts. Users with the User Manager role that have access only to a single partition can create, modify, delete, and view only those user accounts that are in that partition and that have access to that partition only.  User accounts with the User Manager role can change their own passwords.
Manager	This role grants users permission to create, modify, and delete virtual servers, nodes, pools, pool members, custom profiles, and custom monitors. Users in this role can view all objects on the system and change their own passwords.
Certificate Manager	This role grants users permission to manage device certificates and keys, as well as perform Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) operations.
Application Editor	This role grants users permission to modify nodes, pools, pool members, monitors and change their own passwords. These users can view all objects on the system.
Operator	This role grants users permission to enable or disable nodes and pool members. These users can view all objects.
Auditor	This role grants users permission to view all configuration data on the system, including logs and archives. Users with this role cannot create, modify, or delete any data, nor can they view TLS keys or user passwords. (Note: Because this is BIG-IP user role only grants read-only access, it does not meet the STIPM Auditor role definition.)
Log Manager	This role grants users permission to view all configuration data on the system, including logs and archives. The role also grants permission to modify the system log configuration settings, including remote logging, log filters, destinations, and publishers.
Guest	This role grants users permission to view all objects on the system in their partition and Common partition.
No Access	This role prevents users from accessing the system.

**Table 16: BIG-IP User Roles**

The Security Administrator role as defined in FMT\_SMR.2 is provided by a combination of the BIG-IP user roles defined in Table 16, except for the Log Manager, Guest and No Access roles. Administrative users may be assigned different combinations of BIG-IP user roles, so some administrative users may not have the role(s) necessary to perform all of the administrative functions. The Auditor role as defined in FMT\_SMR.2/STIP is provided by the Log Manager BIG-IP user role defined in Table 16. If a user is assigned to any of the following roles, they cannot be simultaneously

assigned to another BIG-IP user role: Log Manager, Administrator, Resource Administrator or Auditor role.

The BIG-IP restricts the ability to modify the behavior of the management functions listed in Table 6 to the Security Administrator and/or Auditor as identified in that table.

The “tmsh sys crypto key” command can be used by the Security Administrator to manage cryptographic keys on the TOE. The Security Administrator can manage the SSH key pairs, TLS key pairs, and pre-shared keys. The Security Administrator is able to perform the following operations on the keys:

- Importing of SSH public keys
- Generating SSL keys
- Changing keys
- Deleting keys
- Installing keys

This functionality implements FMT\_MOF.1/ManualUpdate, FMT\_MOF.1/STIP, FMT\_MTD.1/CryptoKeys, FMT\_MTD.1/CoreData, FMT\_MTD.1/AdminAct, FMT\_SMF.1, FMT\_SMF.1/STIP, FMT\_SMR.2, FMT\_SMR.2/STIP.

## 7.6 Protection of the TSF

### 7.6.1 Protection of Sensitive Data

The TOE protects passwords used for the authentication of administrative users as follows:

- In storage for local user authentication, the TOE’s administrative interfaces do not offer any interface to retrieve user passwords or configuration files.
- In transit between remote users and the TOE, the TOE implements SSH and TLS to protect the communication.

Pre-shared keys (such as credentials for remote servers), symmetric keys, and private keys are stored in the TOE's configuration files. The TOE does not offer an interface to retrieve the contents of its configuration files. Passwords are stored in a salted hashed format.

This functionality implements FPT\_APW\_EXT.1 and FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1.

### 7.6.2 Self-tests

The following self-tests are implemented by the TOE:

- On F5 devices and vCMP. the BIOS Power-On Self-Test POST test is only run at power on
- The OpenSSL integrity tests are run at power on and reboot (during OpenSSL initialization) for OpenSSL.
- The software integrity check (i.e., sys-eicheck.py utility) is run at power on, reboot, and once daily to check the integrity of the RPMs. This self-test can also be run on demand at any time.
- The cryptographic algorithm self-tests provided by OpenSSL are run at power on and reboot (during OpenSSL initialization).

The BIOS POST is a diagnostic program that checks the basic components required for the hardware to operate, tests the memory, and checks the disk controller, the attached disks, and the network controllers. The BIOS POST tests cannot be run on demand.

The fipscheck utility is a standard Open Source utility for verifying the integrity of OpenSSL during initialization.

The sys-eicheck.py utility provides HMAC integrity testing. When a discrepancy is detected, the utility reports that discrepancy. The utility can be run at any time during system operation, and will

just report errors. In addition, the HMAC integrity test is executed during every reboot and will halt the boot if errors are found.

The TOE will execute self-tests at power-on to test the cryptographic algorithms and random number generation using known answer tests for each of the algorithms. If a power-on test fails, the boot process will halt.

The self-tests implemented by the TOE which are described in this section cover all aspects of the TSF are therefore and are sufficient for demonstrating that the TSF is operating correctly in the intended environment.

This functionality implements FPT\_TST\_EXT.1/PowerOn and FPT\_TST\_EXT.1/OnDemand.

### 7.6.3 Update Verification

While the evaluated configuration of the TOE is limited to the specific version and patch level of BIG-IP covered in this ST, the TOE nevertheless provides functionality that supports administrators in verifying the integrity and authenticity of updates provided by F5. The Configuration Utility or tmsh can be used to query the TOE version.

On F5 devices and vCMP, the TOE is able to validate digital signatures of updates provided by F5; F5 places the ISO files (updates) and signature files on their website. The administrative guidance instructs the customer to:

- Download the ISO and digital signature file
- Verify the ISO using that file
- Install the update

A signature file exists for each ISO, software change update or image file provided by F5. The content of the signature file is a digital signature of a SHA256 digest of the ISO image file. The private and public keys are generated using the OpenSSL utility. The signing key is a 2048 bit RSA private key that is stored at F5 CM and only available for official F5 builds. The public key is included in the TMOS filesystem and is available on the F5 official site adjacent to the software archives. Note: The update verification implementation does not utilize certificates; only digital signatures.

The BIG-IP verifies the SHA256 hash of software archives, using 2048-bit RSA digital signature algorithm. If the signature is verified, the software update is installed. If the signature does not verify, the software update installation fails / aborts. The administrative guidance will instruct the customer to download the update again or contact F5 support.

This functionality implements FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.

### 7.6.4 Time Source

The TOE provides reliable time stamps for its own use, in particular in audit records and other time-sensitive security functionality. For F5 devices and vCMP, the TOE hardware includes a hardware-based clock and the TOE's operating system makes the real-time clock available through a mcpd-maintained time stamp. Administrators have the ability to set the hardware-based clock on F5 devices and vCMP.

The security functions that rely on this time stamp in the evaluated configuration include:

- generation of audit records
- session locking for administrative users
- timeouts for remote sessions
- certificate validation / revocation

This functionality implements FPT\_STM\_EXT.1.

### 7.6.5 Preservation of Secure State and Trusted Recovery

The BIG-IP system is in a secure state when the DRBG and integrity tests pass, the remote audit server is available, and the BIG-IP can connect to the remote audit server.

During the BIG-IP system boot-up sequence, the cryptographic module performs power-up self-tests, including DRBG and integrity tests. BIG-IP performs continuous random number generator tests. BIG-IP runs software integrity tests (detecting unauthorized changes) during power up and reboots. When BIG-IP detects a DRBG or integrity failure, the BIG-IP system reboots to prohibit any further cryptographic operations. During the boot-up sequence, the cryptographic module performs power-up self-tests and conditional self-tests to ensure that the module is functioning properly. If the self-test fails, the configured threshold number of times (the default is three), the BIG-IP system enters an Error state by halting the system. If the BIG-IP is in an Error state that caused the system to halt, BIG-IP must be booted to another volume or reinstalled to recover and reload the configuration.

BIG-IP periodically checks the availability of the external audit server. If the remote audit server is unavailable, BIG-IP stores the audit records locally on disk and attempts to reconnect with the remote audit server within seconds of each failed attempt. In addition, while the remote server is unavailable, BIG-IP collects the audit records in a buffer. If the connection to the remote audit server is reestablished before the buffer overflows, the audit records in the buffer are sent to the remote audit server and no audit records are lost. If the buffer overflows before the connection to the remote audit server is reestablished, BIG-IP enters a degraded state in which traffic processing is halted and only auditable actions by the Security Administrator are allowed.

This functionality implements FPT\_FLS.1, FPT\_RCV.1.

### 7.6.6 Key Protection

The following different types of keys are stored on the TOE:

- embedded CA's private and public key
- public and private key of forged server certificate
- TLS RSA private and public key,
- TLS ECDSA private and public key
- TLS EC Diffie-Hellman private and public key
- TLS pre-master secret and master secret
- TLS session keys
- SSH shared secrets (session keys)
- SSH EC Diffie-Hellman private key
- SSH RSA private key
- SSH ECDSA private key

In the CC evaluated configuration, the system is in appliance mode. Appliance mode disables root access to the TOE operating system and disables bash shell. None of the private or secret keys can be exported, modified, or deleted; only the public keys can be exported using the Configuration utility (web-based GUI). The keys are protected using file system permissions.

This functionality implements FPT\_KST\_EXT.1 and FPT\_KST\_EXT.2.

## 7.7 TOE Access

For interactive user authentication at the web-based Configuration utility via HTTPS and the command line tmsh via SSH or the serial port console, BIG-IP implements the display of administrator-defined banners to users.

This functionality implements FTA\_TAB.1.

The TOE terminates local and remote administrative user sessions (Console, Configuration Utility or tmsh) after an administrator-defined period of inactivity. Users can also actively terminate their sessions (log out).

This functionality implements FTA\_SSL\_EXT.1, FTA\_SSL.3.

Lastly, administrators are able to actively terminate these sessions (i.e., to log out and therefore close an authenticated session).

This functionality implements FTA\_SSL.4.

## 7.8 Trusted Path/Channels

The TOE acts as the TLS client when communicating with audit servers for the protection of audit records sent from the TOE to an external audit server. As described in Section 7.4.2, the TOE is configured to require a mutually authenticated connection with the external audit server. The external audit server provides a certificate to the TOE during establishment of the TLS connection in order to authenticate the external audit server.

This functionality implements FTP\_ITC.1.

Network administrators connect to the TOE remotely via a dedicated network interface to administer the TOE. Administrators are authenticated locally by user name and password; remote authentication (via LDAP or AD) is not supported by the TOE. The TOE implements the following trusted paths, which are logically distinct from other communication paths and provide assured identification of both end points, as well as protecting the transmitted data from disclosure and providing detection of modification of the transmitted data:

- TLS Connections to the TOE via the web-based Configuration utility, iControl API and the iControl REST API are protected by TLS. TLS sessions are limited to TLS versions 1.1 and 1.2, using the cipher suites identified in FCS\_TLSS\_EXT.1[3]-[4].
- SSH Connections to the TOE's command line interface are protected using SSH version 2 as defined in FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1. Additionally, the SSH implementation has hard-coded `ecdh-sha2-nistp256` and `ecdh-sha2-nistp384` key exchange; `diffie-hellman-group1-sha1` key exchange is intentionally disabled.

This functionality implements FTP\_TRP.1/Admin.